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Officer Kay Oss of the Midgard State Police received a 
report from a guidance counselor that a fourteen-year-old 
girl, Stacy, disclosed she was sexually abused by a forty-
three-year-old man named John. Stacy told Officer Oss 
that John physically harmed her and took sexually explicit 
photos of her with his cell phone. Officer Oss is 
investigating John for various offenses he committed 
against Stacy. To support her investigation, Officer Oss 
wishes to obtain information from the cloud-based storage 
provider used by John, but she is uncertain whether she 
may obtain this information with a Midgard search warrant, 
as the servers used by the provider are located in Virginia. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Digital evidence exists in almost every criminal case and provides 
unparalleled corroborative utility, particularly for crimes often committed 
in secret, such as child exploitation. This evidence is increasingly stored 
remotely on servers across state lines, around the globe, and beyond.6 It is 
therefore critical for prosecutors and law enforcement to develop an 
understanding of the pertinent domestic and international legal 
considerations for obtaining remotely stored data. 
This Article provides an overview of the Stored Communications 
Act (SCA), the trajectory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since the 
SCA’s passage, relevant provisions of the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of 
Data (CLOUD) Act, and bilateral agreements following the enactment of 
the CLOUD Act. This Article uses real-life scenarios that prosecutors and 
law enforcement face to explore the potential pitfalls of accessing remotely 
stored data and proposes possible solutions to those problems. Examples 
include practices for obtaining domestically stored data, obtaining 
internationally stored data via the CLOUD Act agreement or mutual legal 
assistance treaty (MLAT), obtaining internationally stored data in the 
absence of the CLOUD Act agreements or MLATs, and obtaining data 
stored in extraterrestrial locations. 
                                                           
6 Industry forecasters predict significant annual growth rates and increasing global cloud 
service revenue. See Louis Columbus, Public Cloud Soaring to $331B by 2022 According 
to Gartner, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2019/04/07/public-cloud-soaring-to-331b-by-
2022-according-to-gartner/?sh=7b4726665739 [https://perma.cc/B526-2JU3]; see also infra 
Section V.F. 
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II. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A.  The Stored Communications Act 
 The SCA “creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy 
protections by statute, regulating the relationship between government 
investigators and service providers in possession of users’ private 
information.”7 Notably, Congress enacted the SCA in 1986, before many of 
today’s predominant technologies even existed.8 Disposable cameras were 
new arrivals to mainstream culture,9 but the World Wide Web10 and 
Nintendo Game Boy11 would not debut for another three years. Given this 
cultural and technological context, it is unsurprising that the SCA’s 
provisions are often difficult for courts to reconcile with modern technology 
such as cloud-based data storage and complex anonymization platforms. 
The SCA applies when law enforcement requests records or data 
about a customer from a communications service provider, rather than 
obtaining the same records from the customer’s own computer or device.12 
Prior to the enactment of the SCA, the third-party doctrine enabled law 
enforcement to obtain this data without violating the Fourth Amendment. 
 The United States Supreme Court created the third-party 
doctrine in the cases of Smith13 and Miller.14 The doctrine states that a 
person who voluntarily provides information to a third party relinquishes 
any reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, thus eliminating 
Fourth Amendment protection on that data.15 In Smith, the Court 
concluded that because the defendant voluntarily released dialed 
information to the telephone company and assumed the risk that such 
information could be revealed to the police, the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his 
                                                           
7 Rudolph J. Burshnic, Applying the Stored Communications Act to the Civil Discovery of 
Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1261–62 (2012) (quoting Orin S. 
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004)). 
8 Id. at 1261. 
9 Ernie Smith, Point, Shoot, and Forget, TEDIUM (July 26, 2018), 
https://tedium.co/2018/07/26/disposable-camera-history/ [https://perma.cc/F8C2-MWAE]. 
10 History of the Web, WORLD WIDE WEB FOUND., 
https://webfoundation.org/about/vision/history-of-the-web/ [https://perma.cc/8EZ5-5DL4]. 
11 Game Boy, NAT’L MUSEUM AM. HIST., 
https://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_1253117 
[https://perma.cc/5TZ7-ZYUL]. 
12 Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1262. 
13 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
14 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
15 Id. at 443. 
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telephone.16 In Miller, the Court held that the defendant’s bank records, 
which showed the existence of the defendant’s illegal whiskey enterprise, 
were voluntarily disclosed to the bank when the defendant made 
purchases.17 Because these records were voluntarily disclosed, the defendant 
                                                           
16 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745. 
On March 5, 1976, in Baltimore, Md., Patricia McDonough was 
robbed. She gave the police a description of the robber and of a 1975 
Monte Carlo automobile she had observed near the scene of the crime. 
. . . On March 16, police spotted a man who met McDonough’s 
description driving a 1975 Monte Carlo in her neighborhood. By tracing 
the license plate number, police learned that the car was registered in 
the name of petitioner, Michael Lee Smith. 
The next day, the telephone company, at police request, installed a pen 
register at its central offices to record the numbers dialed from the 
telephone at petitioner’s home. The police did not get a warrant or court 
order before having the pen register installed. The register revealed that 
on March 17 a call was placed from petitioner's home to McDonough’s 
phone. On the basis of this and other evidence, the police obtained a 
warrant to search petitioner's residence. . . . 
Petitioner was indicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore for robbery. 
By pretrial motion, he sought to suppress “all fruits derived from the 
pen register” on the ground that the police had failed to secure a warrant 
prior to its installation. The trial court denied the suppression motion, 
holding that the warrantless installation of the pen register did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 737–38 (internal citations omitted). 
17 Miller, 425 U.S. at 446. 
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informant’s tip, a deputy 
sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped a van-type truck occupied 
by two of respondent’s alleged co-conspirators. The truck contained 
distillery apparatus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke 
out in a . . . warehouse rented to respondent. During the blaze firemen 
and sheriff department officials discovered a 7,500-gallon-capacity 
distillery, 175 gallons of non-tax-paid whiskey, and related 
paraphernalia. 
. . . [A]gents from the Treasury Department’s Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms Bureau presented grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the 
clerk of the District Court, and completed by the United States 
Attorney’s office, to the presidents of the [two banks], where respondent 
maintained accounts. The subpoenas required the two presidents to 
appear on January 24, 1973, and to produce  
“all records of accounts, i.e., savings, checking, loan 
or otherwise . . . .” 
The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoenas had been 
served but ordered their employees to make the records available and 
to provide copies of any documents the agents desired. 
Id. at 437–38 (internal citations omitted). 
Respondent was convicted of possessing an unregistered still, carrying 
on the business of a distiller without giving bond and with intent to 
defraud the Government of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of 
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did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to them.18 In recent years, 
the Court ruled that the third-party doctrine fails to justify government 
access to electronic communications made by a cell phone user and 
recorded by a cell phone provider under the Fourth Amendment.19 
The SCA protects private customer data by creating different legal 
process levels based on the type of data sought by a government entity, 
which addresses Fourth Amendment privacy issues caused by the third-
party doctrine.20 The Act creates three categories of data: subscriber data 
(account holder name and address); transactional data (connectivity to 
account data); and content data (open and closed emails, group 
membership).21 The SCA designated both subscribers and transactional 
data as non-content.22 The three legal process levels created by the SCA 
correspond with the type of data being requested; more appreciable data 
requires a higher legal process.23 
Law enforcement may obtain subscriber data with a subpoena from 
a court of competent jurisdiction.24 Data in this category includes basic 
subscriber information related to the customer’s identity, the customer’s 
relationship with the service provider, payment method, and basic 
connection records.25 Transactional data includes information such as 
                                                           
whiskey upon which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud 
the United States of tax revenues. Prior to trial respondent moved to 
suppress copies of checks and other bank records obtained by means of 
allegedly defective subpoenas Duces tecum served upon two banks at 
which he had accounts. . . . 
The District Court overruled respondent’s motion to suppress, and the 
evidence was admitted. 
Id. at 436–37 (internal citations omitted). 
18 Id. at 446 (“[W]e hold that respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment interest to 
challenge the validity of the subpoenas.”). 
19 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (allowing the government 
access to cell-site records, which “hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life,’” and 
contravenes any reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s physical movements). 
20 Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1262–63. 
21 DAVID W. HAGY, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM: A 
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTORS 3 (2007). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 4. 
25 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2018). 
A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing 
service shall disclose to a governmental entity the— 
(A) name; 
(B) address; 
(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or 
records of session times and durations; 
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account activity logs, email addresses of the customer’s correspondents, and 
friends lists; law enforcement may obtain this information with a court order 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) of the SCA.26 This document is often referred 
to as a 2703(d) order, or a specific and articulable facts order.27 This order 
may be issued by a federal magistrate or a district court with jurisdiction over 
the offense under investigation; state court judges authorized by state law 
may also issue 2703(d) orders.28 The application for a 2703(d) order must 
provide “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that . . . the records or other information sought, are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”29 Finally, content 
data must be obtained with a search warrant based upon probable cause.30 
Data at this level includes everything in the account not considered either 
subscriber or transactional data, such as unopened communications 
(unread text messages or emails).31 Recently, case law added cell site location 
information (CSLI) to the category of content data requiring a warrant for 
law enforcement access.32 
B.  Problems with the Stored Communications Act 
As noted above, the SCA was enacted in an era without the 
advanced technology we know today. The SCA’s drafters could not have 
anticipated the development of robust technology like the smartphone, 
which, as Justice Roberts noted in Carpenter v. United States, is now “almost 
a ‘feature of human anatomy.’”33 In this same vein, it is unlikely the SCA 
drafters could have predicted the global environment of data storage—and 
                                                           
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service 
utilized; 
(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber 
number or identity, including any temporarily assigned 
network address; and 
(F) means and source of payment for such service (including 
any credit card or bank account number), 
of a subscriber to or customer of such service when the governmental 
entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State 
statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or any means 
available under [18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2018)]. 
Id. § 2703(c)(2). 
26 See HAGY, supra note 23, at 4. 
27 See id. 
28 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018). 
29 Id. 
30 HAGY, supra note 23, at 6. 
31 Id. 
32 Id.; see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding that historical 
CSLI must be obtained with a search warrant rather than a § 2703(d) order). 
33 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). 
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the jurisdictional issues that arise from that extensive system. Initially, the 
SCA only regulated data held within the territorial boundaries of the United 
States. The SCA created authority for law enforcement from one state to 
use the legal process to obtain stored communications on servers in a 
different state under a long-arm jurisdiction theory. With the exponential 
growth in technology use and data storage, many of today’s communication 
companies stretch outside the United States.34 For example, a United States 
communications company based in Washington state may host data on 
servers worldwide to meet international users’ needs and data storage space 
requirements. Before amendment by the CLOUD Act, the SCA was silent 
regarding a US-based law enforcement officer’s ability to access the same 
data on the company’s server abroad. 
Domestication of legal process was one of the jurisdictional 
difficulties the SCA sought to remedy. Before the SCA existed, local laws 
often mandated law enforcement to domesticate the legal process in either 
the company’s state of incorporation or the state the data resided in. This 
arduous process often required the out-of-state law enforcement official to 
communicate with a local law enforcement agency. The out-of-state law 
enforcement officer would have to fill out an affidavit for the particular 
account or data sought and send the request to the local agency. The local 
agency then filled out the actual legal process and submitted it to the 
company. The company then responded with the relevant data to the local 
law enforcement agency, which had to forward it back to the out-of-state 
agency making the original request. The entire process embodied the age-
old adage of a game of telephone.  
Unfortunately, in trying to remedy the domestication issue, the 
SCA created an entirely different jurisdictional problem. Although the SCA 
is a federal statute, it relies on both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
for federal cases and the state level judicial process authorizing subpoenas, 
2703(d) orders, and search warrants in state cases.35 The SCA empowers a 
court of competent jurisdiction to issue a subpoena, court order, or a search 
warrant for the search and seizure of any information delineated in the Act.36 
A court of competent jurisdiction may be either a federal or state court, 
provided the court has jurisdiction over the offense.37 The jurisdictional 
component of the SCA is broad to provide for the availability of multiple 
courts to issue warrants under the SCA.38 
                                                           
34 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY, PRIVACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
AROUND THE WORLD: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT 10 (2019) 
[hereinafter THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT]. 
35 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (2018). 
36 Id. § 2703(d). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. In a federal context, a “court of competent jurisdiction” is defined in relevant part as: 
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The SCA’s specific jurisdictional issue emerges when a state judge 
issues legal process under the auspices of the SCA’s authority for digital data 
stored outside of the territorial boundary of the issuing state. Importantly, a 
court of competent jurisdiction includes “a court of general criminal 
jurisdiction of a State authorized by the law of that State to issue search 
warrants.”39 As noted in the legislative history for the initial enactment of the 
SCA and its subsequent amendments via the PATRIOT Act, Congress 
intended the authority granted by the SCA to issue warrants for stored 
communications to be broad in application to accommodate expanding 
technologies.40 One court acknowledged that the general authority of a state 
court to issue warrants is sufficient; specific authority to issue warrants in 
cases of stored communications is not required.41 A prior version of § 
2703(a) stated: 
                                                           
(A) any district court of the United States (including a magistrate judge 
of such a court) or any United States court of appeals that— 
(i) has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated; [or] 
(ii) is in or for a district in which the provider of a wire or 
electronic communication service is located or in which the 
wire or electronic communications, records, or other 
information are stored; or 
(iii) is acting on a request for foreign assistance. 
Id. § 2711(3)(A)(i)–(iii). The last jurisdictional provision, whereby a federal judge may issue 
a warrant when acting on a request for foreign assistance, is distinct from authority granted 
by the CLOUD Act. This jurisdictional provision specifically refers to 18 U.S.C. § 3512 
(2018), which grants federal judges authority to respond to: foreign requests for assistance in 
criminal investigations and prosecutions by issuing search warrants; issue warrants under § 
2703 for stored wire or electronic communications; file orders for pen registers or trap and 
trace devices; or serve subpoenas for testimony or production of documents. 18 U.S.C. § 
3512 (2018). The provision in § 2711(3)(A)(iii) clarifies that a court acting with jurisdictional 
authority under § 3512 is also considered to be a court of competent jurisdiction for purposes 
of issuing warrants, subpoenas, and orders under the SCA. This statutory definition provides 
three ways in which a federal court may qualify as a court of competent jurisdiction for 
purposes of the SCA, which are joined by the word “or.” This conjunction indicates that the 
court issuing the warrant does not necessarily have to be located within the same jurisdiction 
as the location where the electronic communications, records, or other information are 
stored. Any federal district court, federal magistrate judge, or United States appellate court 
that meets the court of competent jurisdiction definition may issue a warrant, subpoena, or 
court order for information protected by the SCA. See generally Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc., 
788 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
39 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(B) (2018) (emphasis added). 
40 132 CONG. REC. 14,886 (1986) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (“[L]egislation which 
protects electronic communications from interceptions by either private parties or the 
Government should be comprehensive, and not limited to particular types or techniques of 
communicating.”); see also United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79 (1st Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (concluding “that the term ‘electronic communication’ includes transient electronic 
storage that is intrinsic to the communication process for such communications.”). 
41 Hubbard, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 323–24. 
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A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communication service of the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in 
electronic storage in an electronic communications system 
for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a 
warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with 
jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or an 
equivalent State warrant.42 
Thus, a state court could have the authority to issue a warrant by either 
having jurisdiction over the offense being investigated or by being in the 
district where the stored communications are located. 
State authority to issue warrants under the SCA is identical to the 
federal authority, though additional process might be required to ensure a 
warrant’s validity if issued by the state court judge.43 The U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York in the case of Hubbard v. Myspace, 
                                                           
On December 1, 2007, Georgia authorities arrested plaintiff for 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor and “enticing a child for 
indecent purposes.” On January 29, 2008, in the course of investigating 
plaintiff’s alleged crimes, the sheriff’s office of Cherokee County, 
Georgia, obtained a search warrant from the Magistrate Court of 
Cherokee County. The warrant instructed “all peace officers of the state 
of Georgia” to search MySpace’s custodian of records in Beverly Hills, 
California, for: 
“Records concerning the identity of the user with 
the Friend ID 79001021 consisting of name, postal 
code, country, e-mail address, date of account 
creation, IP address at account sign-up, logs 
showing IP address and date stamps for account 
accesses, and the contents of any private messages 
in the user’s inbox and sent mail folders.” 
That same day, the sheriff’s office faxed the warrant to MySpace’s 
custodian of records in California. MySpace subsequently “accessed and 
produced and disclosed the requested personal and private user 
information, data, records and/or the contents of electronic 
communications to law enforcement.”  
Id. at 321. Hubbard ultimately entered a guilty plea but later sued Myspace, alleging that 
“MySpace’s disclosure of records and information pertaining to his account violated the 
Stored Communications Act. . . .” Id. The Hubbard court noted that extraterritorial warrants 
are permissible under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) and dismissed the complaint. Id. at 325–26. 
42 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2009) (emphasis added). 
43 See Hubbard, 788 F. Supp. 2d. at 325. While Hubbard states “Section 2703(a) does not 
impermissibly expand the power of Georgia magistrates or any other courts,” the court’s 
analysis seems to suggest that, if the warrant issued by the state magistrate conforms to the 
requirements of a SCA warrant issued by a federal magistrate, then the warrant will be 
enforceable so long as the state has a long-arm statute allowing for extraterritorial 
applicability, as Georgia did in this case. Id. at 326. 
10
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Inc., focusing on the “equivalent State warrant” portion of this statute, held 
that the qualifications of a federal court to be a court of competent 
jurisdiction were implicitly applied to the qualifications of a state court.44 
The Hubbard court interpreted the “jurisdiction over the offense under 
investigation” provision to require only that the judge has the authority to 
issue a warrant for the investigation; there is no requirement for the issuing 
judge to have the jurisdiction to preside over a trial for the suspect for whom 
the warrant is issued.45 The court found that by passing the SCA, Congress 
“specifically intended to allow federal courts to authorize searches beyond 
their normal territorial jurisdictions,”46 and if this is true of federal courts, 
“the same ought to be true of equivalent state warrants.”47 Hubbard further 
noted that Georgia law “appears to recognize the heightened territorial 
authority that magistrates and judges may have in issuing [SCA] warrants.”48 
Congress clearly intended for warrants issued under the SCA by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to extend beyond territorial jurisdiction; as 
the Ackies49 court articulated, the SCA empowered courts to “permit 
searches . . . beyond the courts’ usual geographic jurisdictions.”50 The House 
Report clarified this point in 2001 when the PATRIOT Act, which 
amended the SCA in part, passed: 
An investigator, for example, located in Boston who is 
investigating a suspected terrorist in that city, might have to 
seek a suspect’s electronic e-mail from an Internet service 
                                                           
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 324. 
46 Id. at 325. 
47 Id. at 326. 
48 Id. While this case was heard in the Southern District of New York, the search warrant at 
issue (which plaintiff claimed violated the SCA) was issued by a state magistrate in Georgia, 
authorizing “all peace officers of the state of Georgia” to search MySpace records relevant to 
the plaintiff’s alleged offenses under a Georgia law that criminalized “contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor and ‘enticing a child for indecent purposes.’” Id. at 321. MySpace, a 
company located in California, had a choice of forum provision within its Terms of Use 
Agreement, making New York the appropriate forum. Class Action Complaint at 3, 
Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-CV-0433). 
49 United States v. Ackies, 918 F.3d 190, 202 (1st Cir. 2019). “Law enforcement began 
investigating Ackies in the fall of 2015, beginning with information from a cooperating witness 
who became a cooperating defendant . . . concerning his drug trafficking with a man he knew 
then as ‘Boyd’ (determined at trial to be Ackies).” Id. at 195. Investigators obtained precise 
location information (PLI) “from a magistrate judge in Maine pursuant to a provision of the 
SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (‘Rule 41’) for two cell phones.” Id. “Ackies 
was arrested . . . and charged in February 2016 with violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 
841(a)(1), conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine 
base.” Id. The defendant moved to suppress the PLI warrants on several grounds, but the 
First Circuit rejected the defendant’s attempt to apply Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure to limit the jurisdiction conferred by the SCA. Id. at 201–03. 
50 Id. at 202. 
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provide[r] (ISP) account located in California. The 
investigator would then need to coordinate with agents, 
prosecutors and judges in the district in California where 
the ISP is located to obtain a warrant to search . . . . [The 
Act] amends § 2703 to authorize the court with jurisdiction 
over the investigation to issue the warrant directly.51 
Further, the text of § 2711 clarifies that “the term ‘court of competent 
jurisdiction’ includes . . . a court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State 
authorized by the law of that State to issue search warrants.”52 One court 
acknowledged that the word “includes” was originally the word “means” 
prior to the 2009 amendment to the SCA; by using the word “includes,” 
Congress intended to expand the definition of “court of competent 
jurisdiction.”53 This same court acknowledged that each state may have 
differing procedures and laws regarding the operation of the state court 
system.54 To avoid this problem, Congress used broad language to create a 
statute that allows for the authorization of many types of state courts to issue 
warrants under the SCA, provided that the court has general criminal 
jurisdiction.55  
 The only remaining jurisdictional hurdle to clear, if any, is posed 
by a state’s constitution or long-arm statute.56 In the absence of any clear 
prohibition by state law, the SCA confers jurisdiction to state courts in this 
                                                           
51 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, at 57 (2001)); see also In re Yahoo, Inc., No. 07-
3194-MB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37601 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007) (finding that Congress 
intended for district courts to have the authority under the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act to obtain electronically-stored communications from other jurisdictions). 
52 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(B) (2018). 
53 John K. MacIver Inst. for Pub. Pol’y, Inc. v. Schmitz, 243 F.Supp.3d 1028, 1033 (W.D. 
Wis. 2017). “In this civil action, The John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc., 
purports to assert class claims against various state actors, alleging that they violated the [SCA] 
. . . by seizing electronic information pursuant to search warrants issued by a County Circuit 
Court Judge during the course of a Wisconsin . . . proceeding.” Id. at 1030. The defendants 
moved to dismiss, in part based on SCA statutory defenses. The court granted the motions 
to dismiss, finding no SCA violation since the warrants in question were issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. Id. at 1032–35. Among other arguments for a broader interpretation 
of SCA jurisdiction, the court noted that “the SCA specifically makes valid warrants issued 
by federal magistrate judges[, which] further suggests that Congress did not intend to 
exclusively limit those [SCA-conferred] powers to judges who can enter felony judgments.” 
Id. at 1034. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 See infra Part VI (listing state long-arm statutes and related case law); see also Long-Arm 




Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss3/6
1084 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
context;57 SCA warrants are not limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the 
issuing authority.58 This “promote[s] prosecutorial and judicial efficiency by 
permitting courts in locus of crime to preside over both investigation and 
adjudication,” and also relieves the burden on courts in jurisdictions that 
host larger internet-service providers.59 
C.  Fourth Amendment Implications and Stored Communications Act 
Trajectory 
 As mentioned previously, the third-party doctrine and the SCA 
are less than perfect means for handling today’s technology which, when 
considering the collective data from these powerful devices, paints a near-
perfect picture of individuals’ daily lives. This picture is much more intimate 
than a thermal imaging device,60 disclosing “at what hour each night the lady 
                                                           
57 See State v. Esarey, 67 A.3d 1001, 1008 n.17 (Conn. 2013) (“Indeed, there is nothing in 
the language of § 54-33a, our search warrant statute, that expressly restricts a trial judge’s 
authority to order searches to Connecticut’s borders. . . . Thus, consistent with the Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b), it would appear to us that, under our existing 
statutes, a Connecticut trial judge may, in connection with the investigation of a crime 
committed here, order a search of electronically stored communications contained on a 
remote computing service’s server located in another state . . . .”). 
58 Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 319, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
59 Esarey, 67 A.3d at 1008 (analyzing In re Yahoo, Inc., No. 07-3194-MB, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 37601 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007)). Commentators have opined that certain Patriot Act 
amendments were designed “to shift the responsibility for issuance” of search warrants from 
courts where service providers are located “to the court with jurisdiction over the offense 
being investigated,” since prior to the Patriot Act, “a disproportionate number of such orders 
were issued in the Eastern District of Virginia, where AOL is located.” Patricia L. Bellia, 
Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1454 (Aug. 
2004). This was also calculated to reduce the unnecessary costs, which accompany 
domestication of search warrants. Paul K. Ohm, Parallel Effect Statutes and E-mail 
“Warrants”: Reframing the Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 
1614–15, n.80 (Aug. 2004) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, at 57 (2001)). 
60 The Kyllo Court determined whether use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at 
a private residence was considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  
In 1991 Agent William Elliott of the United States Department of the 
Interior came to suspect that marijuana was being grown in the home 
belonging to petitioner Danny Kyllo. . . . Indoor marijuana growth 
typically requires high-intensity lamps. In order to determine whether 
an amount of heat was emanating from petitioner’s home consistent with 
the use of such lamps, at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, Agent Elliott 
and Dan Haas used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to 
scan the triplex. Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which 
virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye. The 
imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth -- black 
is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; in that 
respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images. 
The scan of Kyllo’s home took only a few minutes and was performed 
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of the house takes her daily sauna and bath,”61 and infinitely more 
comprehensive of a person’s daily movements than could ever be obtained 
through a law enforcement officer’s personal observation of an individual’s 
movements on the street. 
The Supreme Court has recognized, even if it has not directly 
confronted, the Fourth Amendment privacy issues created by the SCA and 
the third-party doctrine. The Court seems to favor a reasonable expectation 
of privacy approach, which may take the form of a pattern of life analysis 
and mosaic theory approach. This Section discusses the Supreme Court’s 
present views on the third-party doctrine and predicts how the Court may 
handle future challenges to the SCA on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
 The Court has maintained that the third-party doctrine, as applied 
to content protected under the SCA, is still good law; however, in recent 
years, the Court has noted that digital data stored on a device and sent to 
servers belonging to cell phone providers may require more protection, but 
it has not overturned Smith or Miller.62 Two major concepts are relevant for 
discussing a broad means of protection for potentially revealing digital data 
rather than the “one size fits all” approach currently present in the third-
party doctrine. These concepts are known as the mosaic theory and pattern 
of life analysis and, while distinct, discussion of one necessarily requires 
discussion of the other in the same context.  
The idea behind the mosaic theory63 is that a long-term, large-scale 
data collection effort may reveal details about an individual that a single 
                                                           
from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott’s vehicle across the street from 
the front of the house and also from the street in back of the house. The 
scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner’s 
home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and 
substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex. Agent Elliott 
concluded that petitioner was using halide lights to grow marijuana in 
his house, which indeed he was. Based on tips from informants, utility 
bills, and the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a 
warrant authorizing a search of petitioner’s home, and the agents found 
an indoor growing operation involving more than 100 plants. 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001) (holding that the thermal imaging 
constituted an unlawful search). 
61 Id. at 38. 
62 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (finding that attachment of a GPS device 
to a vehicle and surveillance of vehicle’s movements on public streets was a “search” within 
the Fourth Amendment); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (finding 
government surveillance of an individual’s physical movements captured through CSLI was 
considered a “search”); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (holding interest in 
protecting officers’ safety and preventing destruction of evidence did not justify dispensing 
with warrant requirements for searches of cell phone data).  
63 Cultural anthropology and financial investment analysis both use the term “mosaic theory.” 
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 
(2012). In a legal context, the term was first coined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
14
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss3/6
1086 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
observation could not reveal.64 A mosaic is composed of hundreds or 
thousands of pieces of glass; looking at each piece individually, one cannot 
discern much. When those pieces of glass are arranged in a particular way, 
one may step back and look at the pieces of glass to see the beautiful image 
that is formed. Likewise, different digital data pieces may be gathered from 
various sources that do not reveal much about the user, but when put 
together, a larger picture of the person’s daily life may form. Putting the 
pieces together forms the mosaic; adding more pieces forms an even larger 
mosaic. Stepping back and looking at the whole mosaic to see something 
much more than the sum of its parts is the pattern of life analysis. 
The pattern of life analysis refers to figuring out the normal habits 
of a person’s life—both public and private.65 Traditional law enforcement 
and intelligence techniques can establish a pattern of life for a particular 
person; however, technology allows law enforcement to establish a pattern 
of life in a more comprehensive manner. This can be done through 
examining the digital evidence on a smartphone—call logs, GPS coordinates, 
time-stamped photos66—or any number of other digital devices, from 
wearable health monitors to home assistants to smart vehicles. 
For example, a law enforcement officer working the beat may see 
an individual enter a gym at nine o’clock on a Tuesday morning, but the 
officer may not know what the individual does after leaving the gym unless 
the officer followed him. This type of investigation requires time, personnel, 
and documentation. If the same officer wished to track the same individual’s 
movements by using the GPS data from the individual’s cell phone, then 
the officer would have an even more comprehensive picture of the 
individual’s whereabouts than if the officer followed the individual. 
Each individual GPS data point (the pieces of glass in the mosaic 
analogy) places the individual at a particular location at a particular time. 
The officer, with very little effort other than requesting the information from 
the cell phone provider, will be able to see that individual’s pattern of life. 
The officer may note that the individual goes to the gym four days a week, 
works in an office building downtown, and visits the Protestant church once 
a week. These details, while seemingly innocent on the surface, may prove 
to reveal much more personal information that an individual may not wish 
to disclose to anyone—let alone law enforcement—such as the individual’s 
religious or political affiliations or sexual practices. 
                                                           
District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), an 
underpinning of Jones. Id. 
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 The Supreme Court has shifted away from strict application of 
the third-party doctrine to analyzing the type of data collected, the amount 
of data collected, and the time period represented by the data.67 This shift 
began in United States v. Jones, which was decided on other grounds, but 
Justice Sotomayor criticized the third-party doctrine in a separate concurring 
opinion.68 Justice Sotomayor noted that the Court should revisit the third-
party doctrine, stating, 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which 
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves 
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. 
. . . I for one doubt that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of 
a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or 
month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, 
they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy 
as a prerequisite for privacy.69 
In its continued reexamination of digital data, the Court in Riley v. 
California70 held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited a warrantless 
                                                           
67 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206; Riley, 573 U.S. at 37. 
68 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012). In Jones, the government placed a 
tracking device on the undercarriage of the defendant’s wife’s car, and the government 
tracked the car (used by the defendant for drug operations) over the course of four weeks. 
Id. at 403. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, seemed to resurrect the long-dead trespass 
analysis for determining whether a search under the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Id. 
at 404–12. Justice Alito noted in concurrence that trespass is unnecessary for many forms of 
surveillance. Id. at 429–31 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, elaborating on Justice 
Alito’s comment, noted the reasonable expectation of privacy test, as established in Katz v. 
United States, augmented the trespass test, meaning trespass is sufficient (but not necessary) 
to find a search took place. Id. at 414–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Katz v. United 
States, 389, U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). This is particularly important in today’s age with 
electronically stored data, and Justice Sotomayor discusses the dangers of relying on the 
majority’s opinion and the trespass analysis alone since there can be no physical trespass of 
digital data. Id. at 417–18. 
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
70 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired 
registration tags. In the course of the stop, the officer also learned that 
Riley’s license had been suspended. The officer impounded Riley’s car, 
pursuant to department policy, and another officer conducted an 
inventory search of the car. Riley was arrested for possession of 
concealed and loaded firearms when that search turned up two 
handguns under the car’s hood. 
An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and found items 
associated with the “Bloods” street gang. He also seized a cell phone 
from Riley’s pants pocket. According to Riley’s uncontradicted 
assertion, the phone was a “smart phone,” a cell phone with a broad 
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search of a cell phone, on the grounds that a cell phone does not pose a risk 
to officer safety to justify a search of the phone’s contents incident to its 
owner’s arrest. The Court noted the cell phones’ immense storage capacity 
and that the data stored on a cell phone can provide a means of 
reconstructing a person’s private life.71 
The Court in Riley did not create a separate standard for digital 
data, yet the Court acknowledged the importance of cell phones in today’s 
society, which helped form the Supreme Court’s future analysis. Carpenter 
v. United States held that cell site location information (CSLI) cannot be 
obtained from cellular service providers by law enforcement without a 
warrant.72 Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, decided that CSLI 
deserves heightened protection due to the data’s revealing nature, and 
society would not reasonably expect law enforcement to be able to monitor 
and document every individual’s movement with near-perfect precision.73 
The Court did not explicitly overrule Smith or Miller to invalidate the third-
party doctrine; Carpenter merely works within the confines of the third-
party doctrine and creates an exception for CSLI. Justice Alito criticized the 
Court’s decision for being entirely unprecedented.74 
Because the Court is beginning to question the third-party 
doctrine’s utility in today’s digital world, prosecutors should be prepared for 
the different avenues of legal process to undergo change or become more 
                                                           
range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large 
storage capacity, and Internet connectivity. The officer accessed 
information on the phone and noticed that some words (presumably in 
text messages or a contacts list) were preceded by the letters “CK”—a 
label that, he believed, stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for 
members of the Bloods gang. 
At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a detective 
specializing in gangs further examined the contents of the phone. The 
detective testified that he “went through” Riley’s phone “looking for 
evidence.” . . . The police also found photographs of Riley standing in 
front of a car they suspected had been involved in a shooting a few weeks 
earlier. 
Riley was ultimately charged, in connection with that earlier shooting, 
with firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, 
and attempted murder. . . . Prior to trial, Riley moved to suppress all 
evidence that the police had obtained from his cell phone. He 
contended that the searches of his phone violated the Fourth 
Amendment, because they had been performed without a warrant and 
were not otherwise justified by exigent circumstances. The trial court 
rejected that argument. 
Id. at 378–79 (internal citations omitted). 
71 Id. at 394. 
72 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
73 Id. at 2218. 
74 Id. at 2247. 
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stringent. It appears that, based on the cases discussed above and the 
Justices’ opinions on privacy protections for digital data, the Court may be 
heading in the direction of adopting a pattern of life and mosaic theory 
analysis. An alternative trajectory may focus on a strict review of search 
warrant affidavits, comparing the specific facts of the affidavit’s probable 
cause section to determine whether each category of data requested for 
search and seizure is supported by probable cause and particularity for that 
discrete data type. In support of this trend, boilerplate search warrants for 
“all” the data on a device, or in an account, are being routinely rejected, or 
in the alternative, courts highlight the specific facts supporting unique data 
types and indicating that only those specific categories could be searched.75 
The Justices seem to favor emphasis of privacy concerns over the 
traditional third-party doctrine because when the third-party doctrine was 
created, the technology available to the general public was much more 
simplistic, and the third-party doctrine is impractical considering the sheer 
volume of revealing, personal data that is collected from individuals’ devices 
every second. From this discussion, it is the authors’ opinion that, if 
practicable, law enforcement officers should always obtain a warrant for the 
contents of communications, even if that data may otherwise be obtained 
through a 2703(d) order or subpoena. 
Beyond the Supreme Court opinions, state courts and legislatures 
are also emphasizing privacy over the traditional third-party doctrine. In the 
2020 election, Michigan voters took a dramatic step and approved an 
amendment to the state constitution which expanded warrant requirements 
to include electronic data and electronic communications.76 As amended, 
the Michigan Constitution requires a warrant for the government “to access 
electronic data or electronic communication.”77 It is unclear if the 
                                                           
75 “[S]eparate probable cause is required to search each of the categories of information found 
on the cellphones.” United States v. Morton, 984 F.3d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 2021). “[T]he 
November 12th Warrant did not seek any and all data or digital information; instead, it 
sought only five enumerated categories of digital information. The November 12th Warrant 
did not contain language that would suggest an impermissibly broad scope such as ‘any and 
all’ or ‘including but not limited to.’ The categories limited the search to call logs, subscriber 
information, and various forms of messaging. The November 12th Warrant described what 
the officers believed would be found on the phone with specificity [to the text of the note] 
and thereby satisfied an important metric in judging particularity. Further, the November 
12th Warrant was limited to a three-day period around the shooting, unlike the warrants in 
Wheeler and Buckham that lacked any temporal limitations.” State v. Wilson, No. 
1904007242, 2021 Del. Super. LEXIS 84, at *15 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2021). 
76 See Lester Graham, Election 2020: Michigan Voters Approve Proposal 2, Protecting 
Electronic Data, MICH. RADIO (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/election-
2020-michigan-voters-approve-proposal-2-protecting-electronic-data 
[https://perma.cc/6SDT-9SQV]. 
77 Id. Proposal 2 amended Article 1, Section 11 of the Michigan Constitution to read as 
follows:  
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amendment refers only to data stored locally or if the amendment covers 
data stored by service providers. If the latter holds true, Michigan has 
effectively eliminated the third-party doctrine when applied to electronic 
data and communications. 
In some states without codified exceptions to the third-party 
doctrine for electronic data and communications, state courts have stepped 
in to provide such exceptions, and in some cases, eliminated the third-party 
doctrine altogether.78 A recent outlier decision from Arizona, State v. 
Mixton,79 saw the court decline to apply the third-party doctrine in a case 
involving a defendant’s IP address. There, the court found a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in one’s IP address and required a search warrant to 
obtain one’s IP address, in direct conflict with numerous jurisdictions.80 
                                                           
The person, houses, papers, and possessions, electronic data, and 
electronic communications of every person shall be secure from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or 
to seize any person or things or to access electronic data or electronic 
communications shall issue without describing them, nor without 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. . . . 
Statewide Ballot Proposal 20-2: Protection of Electronic Data and Communications, 
CITIZENS RSCH. COUNCIL MICHIGAN (Oct. 2020), https://crcmich.org/wp-
content/uploads/Memo1164-Proposal_2_Search_and_seizure_of_electronic_data.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XWL3-UJSF]. 
78 See, e.g., People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62, 67 n.6 (Cal. 1984) (rejecting the “fiction” in 
Miller and Smith that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank or phone 
call records); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141–42 (Colo. 1983) (rejecting Smith and 
finding reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 
612 P.2d 1117, 1120–21 (Colo. 1980) (rejecting Miller in construing state constitution’s 
search-and-seizure provisions); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989) 
(replicating the finding in Sporleder); State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014) 
(indicating that Miller and Smith “incorrectly rely on the principle that individuals who 
convey information to a third party have assumed the risk of that party disclosing the 
information to the government. In our times individuals may have no reasonable 
alternative”); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988) (finding that “in Idaho 
there is a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that are 
dialed.”); People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d 1277, 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (describing how 
“[the court] believe[s] that citizens have a legitimate expectation that their telephone records 
will not be disclosed”); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979) (“As we 
believe that Miller establishes a dangerous precedent, with great potential for abuse, we 
decline to follow that case when construing the state constitutional protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991) 
(rejecting Miller). 
79 447 P.3d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019). 
80 See, e.g., Hatcher v. State, 726 S.E.2d 117, 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“[W]e doubt that an 
Internet service subscriber can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber 
information that he voluntarily conveys to an Internet service provider in order to obtain 
Internet service.”); State v. Baric, 919 N.W.2d 221, 228 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018) (“Baric has 
not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in . . . his IP address.”); State v. Lemasters, No. CA2012-12-028, 2013 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3009, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. July 8, 2013) (“Lemaster’s Fourth Amendment rights 
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The Mixton court looked to New Jersey for support in finding a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses81 but failed to 
acknowledge that New Jersey allows law enforcement to obtain IP addresses 
with a subpoena.82 The decision relies heavily on New Jersey as an example 
of a growing trend toward expansions of privacy outweighing law 
enforcement interests in investigating crimes. While the rationale of the 
Mixton court was incorrect and ultimately corrected by the Arizona 
Supreme Court,83 both the trajectory of privacy-oriented jurisprudence and 
the wisdom of obtaining search warrants when practicable, are undeniable. 
                                                           
were not implicated by Detective Penwell’s use of the file-sharing system, or in his obtaining 
Lemasters’ information from Time Warner based upon Lemaster’s IP address.”); State v. 
Rodriguez, No. P2-2014-3011A, 2017 R.I. Super. LEXIS 89, at *28 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 
30, 2017) (“Defendant has not established either a subjectively or objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the subscriber information held by Verizon.”); State v. Mello, 27 
A.3d 771 (2011) (finding individuals have no expectation of privacy in non-content data 
shared with a service provider); Commonwealth v. Do, 86 Va. Cir. 483 (Cir. Ct. 2013) 
(finding that a defendant’s subjective intent to hide his IP address does not create a 
reasonable expectation of privacy); State v. Leblanc, 137 So. 3d 656, 662 (La. Ct. App. 2014) 
(“[W]here an internet subscriber voluntarily discloses routine billing information to an ISP 
in order to receive service, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, 
and, therefore, the issuance of a search warrant for its disclosure would not be required.”); 
State v. Peppin, 347 P.3d 906 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (holding there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in data exposed publicly); State v. Roberts, 345 P.3d 1226, 1236 (Utah 
2015) (noting “the overwhelming weight of authority finding no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in subscription information, like an IP address, given to an internet service 
provider”). 
81 See State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008) (noting that internet users are “entitled to 
expect confidentiality” in this information, and the fact that they have disclosed their 
identities to third party internet service providers “does not upend the privacy interest at 
stake”). 
82 See id. at 36 (explaining that a finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy under the state 
constitution does not necessarily trigger a warrant requirement and that a grand jury 
subpoena satisfies the requirements of the New Jersey Constitution as long as the data “bear 
some possible relationship[, however indirect,] to the grand jury investigation” (citing State v. 
Mcallister, 875 A.2d 866, 876 (N.J. 2005))).  
83 See State v. Mixton, 478 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Ariz. 2021) (holding that search warrants and 
court orders are not required to obtain IP addresses and other ISP subscriber information 
and that an administrative subpoena is sufficient). The Arizona Supreme Court noted that 
an expectation of privacy in this “non-content information is unreasonable in light of the 
nature of the information; it is voluntarily shared with third parties; and such third parties 
own, and often engage in pervasive legal derivative use” of the information. Id. at 1240. 
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III.  CLARIFYING LAWFUL OVERSEAS USE OF DATA ACT 
(CLOUD) ACT84 
The CLOUD Act aims to combat the recent influx of data requests 
to US-based global providers from abroad in a manner that protects user 
privacy and civil liberties.85 The CLOUD Act amends the SCA to include 
an affirmative statement that the SCA covers data stored on servers located 
outside the United States. The CLOUD Act contains two central parts: (1) 
the provision for access to foreign stored data and (2) the authorization of 
bilateral executive agreements to facilitate sharing data held by entities 
within the United States with law enforcement in foreign sovereign 
jurisdictions.86 
A.  Access to Foreign Stored Data 
First, the CLOUD Act facilitates access to electronic information, 
even if it is stored overseas, for law enforcement investigations.87 Data 
covered by the CLOUD Act is the same data covered by the other SCA 
provisions, namely, “contents of a wire or electronic communication and 
any record or other information pertaining to a customer or subscriber.”88 
The data sought must be in a United States corporation’s, organization’s, or 
legal person’s possession or control.89 When law enforcement successfully 
obtains a warrant to access data protected by the SCA and stored abroad, 
the warrant must be honored. 
An issue presented in United States v. Microsoft Corporation led 
to the CLOUD Act’s provision on foreign-stored data.90 In 2013, the federal 
government investigated a drug-trafficking operation and sought a warrant 
under the SCA to require Microsoft to produce all emails and information 
associated with an account hosted by Microsoft.91 The emails the 
government sought were stored on a server owned by Microsoft and located 
                                                           
84 The authors are grateful to Zero Abuse Project’s legal extern Kiley Eichelberg for her 
research contributions. 
85 THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36.  
86 The CLOUD Act, EPIC ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://epic.org/privacy/cloud-act/ [https://perma.cc/LUL6-V4E6]. 
87 Id. 
88 18 U.S.C. § 2713 (2018). 
89 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(1)(B) (2018) defines “United States person” by cross-referencing to 
18 U.S.C. § 2523(a)(2) (2018) (“[A] citizen or national of the United States, an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, an unincorporated association a substantial number of 
members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence, or a corporation that is incorporated in the United States.”). 
90 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded by 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
91 Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1187. 
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in Dublin, Ireland.92 Microsoft challenged the search warrant’s validity as 
applied to the emails, arguing that a United States magistrate does not have 
the jurisdiction to issue a warrant for digital information stored abroad.93 A 
United States magistrate reviewed the challenge and held that a warrant 
under the SCA functions as a warrant and a subpoena—the latter of which 
is not restricted by territorial jurisdictional boundaries—and required 
Microsoft to turn over the emails.94 A district judge upheld the magistrate’s 
ruling.95 
Microsoft appealed to the Second Circuit. The United Kingdom 
Government filed an amicus brief, stating that if the United States 
government wished to obtain data located in Ireland, then the United States 
should use the MLAT between the United States and Ireland.96 The Second 
Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling, invalidating the warrant.97 The 
court held the SCA cannot apply extraterritorially without explicit 
Congressional intent and found no such intent by Congress.98 The Second 
Circuit denied the government’s petition for a rehearing en banc.99 
The United States government filed a petition for certiorari in the 
United States Supreme Court in June 2017, which the Court granted in 
October 2017.100 After the Court heard oral arguments, Congress 
introduced the CLOUD Act, which was signed into law on March 23, 
2018.101 The CLOUD Act resolved the issues presented in United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., and the Supreme Court declared the case moot. 
B.  Bilateral Agreements 
The CLOUD Act addresses foreign governments’ ability to access 
data stored in the United States in the course of criminal investigations.102 It 
does this by providing the authority to create bilateral agreements between 
the United States and other countries.103 Presently, the United States has 
only entered into a bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom, though 
Australia has now paved the way through its domestic law to allow the 





96 Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 
(2d Cir. 2016) (No. 17-2), 2017 WL 6398769. 
97 Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 201–02. 
98 Id. at 211. 
99 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 855 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017). 
100 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 16, 2017) (mem.). 
101 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1187 (2018). 
102 The CLOUD Act, supra note 88. 
103 Id. 
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possibility of a future bilateral agreement with the United States.104 Any 
nation wishing to enter into a bilateral agreement with the United States 
must be determined by the attorney general and secretary of state to meet 
the United States’ high standards of due process and commitment to the 
rule of law.105 Nations with adverse governmental philosophies will not be 
permitted to enter into a bilateral agreement with the United States.106  
Honoring warrants issued pursuant to the SCA and the CLOUD 
Act allows for a streamlined process, whereby the government may bypass 
                                                           
104 Anne-Marie Allgrove, Adrian J. Lawrence, Toby Patten & Anne L. Petterd, Australia - Bill 
Paves the Way for Australia-US Bilateral CLOUD Act Agreement and a New Cross-Border 
Data Access Regime, LEXOLOGY (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2cf0f5f7-4a6b-4523-b04c-4674296f9f74 
[https://perma.cc/T2PB-6XUC]. 
105 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4) (2018).  
106 Id. § 2523(b)(1). The U.S. attorney general with the concurrence of the secretary of state 
must provide a written certification to Congress averring, among other considerations, that  
(1) the domestic law of the foreign government, including the 
implementation of that law, affords robust substantive and procedural 
protections for privacy and civil liberties in light of the data collection 
and activities of the foreign government that will be subject to the 
agreement, if— (A) such a determination under this section takes into 
account, as appropriate, credible information and expert input; and (B) 
the factors to be met in making such a determination include whether 
the foreign government— (i) has adequate substantive and procedural 
laws on cybercrime and electronic evidence, as demonstrated by being 
a party to the Convention on Cybercrime, done at Budapest November 
23, 2001, and entered into force January 7, 2004, or through domestic 
laws that are consistent with definitions and the requirements set forth 
in chapters I and II of that Convention; (ii) demonstrates respect for the 
rule of law and principles of nondiscrimination; (iii) adheres to 
applicable international human rights obligations and commitments or 
demonstrates respect for international universal human rights, 
including— (I) protection from arbitrary and unlawful interference with 
privacy; (II) fair trial rights; (III) freedom of expression, association, and 
peaceful assembly; (IV) prohibitions on arbitrary arrest and detention; 
and (V) prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment; (iv) has clear legal mandates and procedures 
governing those entities of the foreign government that are authorized 
to seek data under the executive agreement, including procedures 
through which those authorities collect, retain, use, and share data, and 
effective oversight of these activities; (v) has sufficient mechanisms to 
provide accountability and appropriate transparency regarding the 
collection and use of electronic data by the foreign government; and (vi) 
demonstrates a commitment to promote and protect the global free flow 
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the cumbersome MLAT procedures.107 The use of MLATs aims to protect 
human rights by requiring foreign governments to work with the 
Department of Justice to obtain warrants from United States judges before 
they can access that data for investigations.108 Before the CLOUD Act, 
foreign governments needed a MLAT ratified by the United States Senate, 
approval from the Department of Justice, and authorization by a judge.109 
Now, foreign governments who have entered into a bilateral agreement with 
the United States may bypass this time-intensive process.  
The CLOUD Act has received its fair share of criticism, mostly 
from those concerned about the international human rights implications of 
such unfettered access to data.110 However, because the CLOUD Act is still 
in its infancy, since the first bilateral agreement was entered rather recently 
(October 3, 2019),111 we have yet to see if these concerns touted by privacy 
advocates have merit in the reality of the CLOUD Act’s operations.  
IV.  UNITED STATES—UNITED KINGDOM 
BILATERAL AGREEMENT 
The United States and the United Kingdom have come to a 
bilateral data-sharing agreement, as authorized by the CLOUD Act, which 
became effective July 8, 2020.112 The agreement’s purpose is to combat 
                                                           
107 Taylor Hatmaker, As the CLOUD Act Sneaks into the Omnibus, Big Tech Butts Heads 
with Privacy Advocates, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 22, 2018, 7:06 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/22/cloud-act-omnibus-bill-house// 
[https://perma.cc/HC5Q-LZA5].  
108 Id.  
109 Id. 
110 In October 2019, twenty NGOs objected to the CLOUD Act, claiming it fails to protect 
privacy and due process rights of citizens. The CLOUD Act, supra note 88. See Re: U.S.-
U.K. CLOUD Act Agreement, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://epic.org/privacy/intl/USUK-CLOUD-Act-Letter-20191028.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J49K-X6EJ] for a list of the objections made by the organizations.  
111 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Access to 
Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/dag/cloud-act-agreement [https://perma.cc/A6SX-64D6] [hereinafter 
Agreement Between U.S. & U.K.].  
112 Supplementary Letter Conveyed to U.S. Congress in Support of U.S.-U.K CLOUD Act 
Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1236281/download [https://perma.cc/99FU-ABHL]. 
The agreement enters into force 180 days after the attorney general provides notice to the 
Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, as well as the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate. Id. The attorney general transmitted notice to all required 
committees on December 4, 2019, but a clerical error rendered notice to the Committees of 
the House of Representatives ineffective. Id. The error was rectified on January 10, 2020 
making the agreement effective on July 8, 2020. Id.  
24
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss3/6
1096 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
“serious crime, including terrorism.”113 The agreement serves as a mutual 
acknowledgment that the legal search and seizure frameworks of both the 
United States and the United Kingdom provide appropriate and substantial 
safeguards that protect the civil liberties of each country’s citizenry.114 Such 
mutual respect provides the rationale for using each country’s own domestic 
law for obtaining data that is stored by a covered provider115 subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the other country.116 
A.  Maintenance of Domestic Law 
As the data sharing agreement is predicated on mutual respect for 
the domestic law of the United States and the United Kingdom, each 
country is required to maintain its domestic law to meet the requirements 
of the data-sharing agreement.117 Each country is to ensure that its domestic 
law does not prevent providers from complying with the agreement.118 As a 
result, the data-sharing agreement restricts the United States’ ability to pass 
legislation that would effectively restrict law enforcement access to data 
stored by covered providers.119 
Orders issued pursuant to the agreement are governed by the 
domestic law of the issuing country.120 Effectively, this means that United 
States law enforcement can obtain data under this agreement from a United 
Kingdom covered provider through the United States’ legal process without 
interference from United Kingdom law, such as the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).121 This does not affect the provider’s right 
to raise applicable legal objections.122 
                                                           
113 Agreement Between U.S. & U.K., supra note 113, art. 2.1. 
114 Id. art. 3.3. 
115 Id. art. 1.7. “Covered Provider means any private entity to the extent that it: (i) provides to 
the public the ability to communicate, or to process or store computer data, by means of a 
Computer System or a telecommunications system; or (ii) processes or stores Covered Data 
on behalf of an entity defined in subsection (i).” Id. 
116 Id. art. 3.3. 
117 Id. art. 3.1. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. art. 3.2. 
121 Id. The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, commonly known as Brexit, 
will likely have an impact on the U.S.-U.K. agreement because the United Kingdom will no 
longer require adherence to the GDPR, as this was a law under the European Union. 
Information Rights at the End of the Transition Period Frequently Asked Questions, INFO. 
COMM’R’S OFF., https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/brexit/2617110/information-rights-and-brexit-faqs-v2_3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9WEM-BL38]. The United Kingdom plans to create its own GDPR, 
which will directly incorporate the European Union’s GDPR. Id. 
122 Agreement Between U.S. & U.K., supra note 113, art. 3.2. 
25
Peters et al.: Not an Ocean Away, Only a Moment Away: A Prosecutor's Primer for
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
2021] NOT AN OCEAN AWAY, ONLY A MOMENT AWAY 1097 
The United Kingdom allows the United States to compel the 
production of data through the United States’ domestic law because the 
United Kingdom recognizes the United States’ privacy and civil rights 
safeguards.123 Should the United States loosen those safeguards, it is required 
to notify the United Kingdom.124 
The agreement does not create a private right of action to obtain, 
suppress, or exclude evidence or to impede execution of legal process.125 
However, domestic law may provide a remedy; invoking the data sharing 
agreement is not blanket immunization from civil penalties, nor is it an 
escape from the grasp of the Fourth Amendment.126 
B.  Proper Targeting 
Orders issued under the agreement must have a proper target with 
respect to both the crime and the person under investigation.127 An order 
targeting a proper crime has the purpose of preventing, investigating, 
detecting, or prosecuting a covered offense.128 A covered offense is a 
“Serious Crime, including terrorist activity.”129 A serious crime must carry a 
maximum sentence of at least three years imprisonment.130 
Orders issued under this agreement cannot intentionally target a 
receiving-party person.131 A receiving-party person is one who, “[w]here the 
United Kingdom is the Receiving Party,” is a:  
Governmental entity or authority of the state; . . . an 
unincorporated association, a substantial number of 
members of which are located in [the territories of the 
United Kingdom]; . . . a corporation located or registered 
in [the territory of the United Kingdom]; or any other 
person located in [the territory of the United Kingdom].132  
In other words, an order under the data-sharing agreement issued by United 
States law enforcement cannot target the account of a person or entity 
located in the United Kingdom. 
Additionally, orders under this agreement may not be used to target 
a valid person under the agreement “if the purpose is to obtain information 
                                                           
123 Id. art. 3.3. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. art. 3.4. 
126 Id. art. 3.2. 
127 Id. art. 4.1, 4.3–4. 
128 Id. art. 4.1. 
129 Id. art. 1.5. 
130 Id. art. 1.14. 
131 Id. art. 4.3. 
132 Id. art. 1.12. 
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concerning a Receiving-Party Person.”133 All orders must target specific 
accounts and must include a specific identifier for the account.134 Law 
enforcement officers cannot use the agreement to infringe upon freedom of 
speech, nor may it be used to “disadvantage persons based on their race, 
sex, sexual orientation, religion, ethnic origin, or political opinions.”135 
C.  Issuance and Transmission of Orders 
United States law enforcement can seek an order compelling the 
disclosure of information or for the preservation of data136 under the 
agreement using the domestic laws of the United States.137 However, orders 
under the agreement must be based on minimum requirements “for a 
reasonable justification based on articulable and credible facts, particularity, 
legality, and severity regarding the conduct under investigation.”138 As orders 
must be in compliance with domestic law, when domestic law imposes a 
stricter standard, such a standard must be met.139 
For United States law enforcement officers, this means that the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act will likely dictate the process to 
obtain data stored by UK-based service providers.140 Additionally, an order 
for the production of data under this agreement is subject to review and/or 
oversight under domestic law of the United States.141 In this respect, 
independent oversight occurs in the issuance of an order under this 
agreement, and such oversight is dictated by the domestic legal authority 
under which the order is authorized.142 
As with domestic orders, when an order seeks interception of wire 
or electronic communications, the order must be for a fixed and limited 
duration, cannot last longer than is reasonably necessary, and the 
information sought must not be reasonably obtainable through less intrusive 
means.143 Orders under this agreement cannot be issued with the purpose 
                                                           
133 Id. art. 4.4. 
134 Id. art. 4.5. 
135 Id. art. 4.2. 
136 See generally id. art. 10. The same rules that apply to compelling disclosure of information 
stored by a covered provider also apply to preservation orders. See id. 
137 Id. art. 5.1. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Some states like California may have strict laws similar to the ECPA that limit the type, 
manner, or method of obtaining data covered by the ECPA. Be sure to consult both state 
and federal law in your jurisdiction prior to your investigation. 
141 Agreement Between U.S. & U.K., supra note 113, art. 5.2. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. art. 5.3. 
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of providing the information obtained to the United Kingdom or a third 
party.144 
Orders are to be directly served on the covered provider by the 
designated authority of the issuing party.145 The designated authority for the 
United States is the attorney general.146 The attorney general may delegate 
duties to additional authorities and set rules and conditions for any 
additional authorities.147 All orders must be reviewed by the attorney general, 
or his designee, prior to serving them upon providers.148 The attorney 
general must certify that the order complies with the domestic laws of the 
United States and that the order fully complies with the agreement.149 The 
provider must be notified that the order is issued pursuant to the agreement 
and granted “a point of contact . . . who can provide information on legal or 
practical issues relating to the Order.”150 If the target of the order is not a 
citizen of the United States and is located outside the territory of the United 
States, the attorney general, or his designee, is to notify the relevant 
authorities in the third country where the target is located, unless the 
“notification would be detrimental to operational or national security, 
impede . . . the investigation, or imperil human rights.”151 
The provider can object to an order issued under the agreement.152 
The provider must raise any objections in a reasonable time to the attorney 
general.153 The attorney general may then respond to the objections.154 If the 
objections are not resolved, the provider may raise the objections with the 
United Kingdom’s designated authority.155 The attorney general and the 
United Kingdom’s designated authority may confer to resolve the 
objections.156 If the objections cannot be resolved between the authorities, 
then the United Kingdom’s designated authority must notify the attorney 
general that the agreement shall not apply to the order.157 The bilateral 
                                                           
144 Id. art. 5.4. 
145 Id. art. 5.5. 
146 Id. art. 1.8. 
147 Id. art. 5.5. 
148 Id. art. 5.6. 
149 Id. art. 5.7. The certification must be in writing and included with the order when 
transmitted to the covered provider. Id.  
150 Id. art. 5.8–9. 
151 Id. art. 5.10. 
152 Id. art. 5.11. Objections must be specific and based on a reasonable belief that the 
agreement has not been properly invoked. Id. 




157 Id. art. 5.12. 
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agreement does not explicitly provide for judicial review of a provider’s 
objection.158 
D.  Production of Information 
When an order is properly served on a covered provider, and all 
objections have been settled, the covered provider is to produce the 
requested information directly to the attorney general.159 The attorney 
general and the provider may make arrangements for the secure 
transmission of the order and the information requested in the order.160 To 
aid in the admissibility of evidence obtained through the agreement, law 
enforcement officers may require the provider to complete forms attesting 
to the authenticity of the records produced or to the absence or non-
existence of such records.161 
E.  Minimization Procedures 
The agreement requires the United States to develop a procedure 
for ensuring that the targeted account belongs to someone covered by the 
agreement.162 The procedures must be employed in good faith and with 
reasonable effort to avoid targeting receiving-party persons.163 
F.  Limitations on Use and Transfer 
United States law enforcement is to handle data received through 
the agreement in accordance with the domestic laws of the United States.164 
For example, if the information collected under the agreement would be 
protected by privacy laws or subject to a Freedom of Information Act 
request if collected under domestic law, the information is still covered by 
those privacy and freedom of information laws.165 
United States law enforcement cannot transfer data obtained under 
the agreement to a third country or international organization without the 
United Kingdom’s consent, unless the data has already been made public.166 
Additionally, the agreement expressly prohibits requirements that the 
                                                           
158 See generally id. art.1–17. 
159 Id. art. 6.1. 
160 Id. art. 6.2. 
161 Id. art. 6.4. 
162 Id. art. 7.1. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. art. 8.1. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. art. 8.2. 
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United States share information obtained under the agreement with the 
United Kingdom or with any third-party government and vice versa.167 
Moreover, both the United States and the United Kingdom have 
specialized national interests implicated by the agreement. For United States 
law enforcement seeking data from a United Kingdom service provider, the 
United Kingdom has a particularly strong interest in the death penalty.168 
When United States law enforcement seeks data from the United Kingdom, 
it must ask for and receive permission from the United Kingdom in order 
to use evidence obtained under this agreement in a death penalty case.169 
The United Kingdom may deny permission, grant permission, or grant 
permission subject to conditions of use.170 The same is true when the United 
Kingdom seeks information from the United States where freedom of 
speech is implicated.171 Additional limits may be set as mutually agreed upon 
by both parties.172 
G.  Compatibility and Non-Exclusivity 
The agreement does not affect any other legal authorities or 
mechanisms for preserving or obtaining electronic data.173 The agreement 
does not affect legal instruments issued under the domestic law of either 
party, requests for mutual legal assistance, or emergency disclosures.174 
H.  Expiry and Termination of the Agreement 
The agreement is in effect until July 8, 2025.175 The United States 
and the United Kingdom may agree to extend the agreement by agreeing, 
in writing, through diplomatic channels.176 By the same token, the agreement 
may be terminated by either party by sending written notice through 
diplomatic channels.177 Termination will be effective one month after the 
date of such notice.178 Should the agreement expire or be terminated, any 
data produced under the agreement may continue to be used but must 
                                                           
167 Id. art. 8.3. 
168 Id. art. 8.4(a). 
169 Id. art. 8.4. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. art. 8.4(b). 
172 Id. art. 8.5. 
173 Id. art. 11.1. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. art. 17.1. The agreement has a term of five years from the date the agreement enters 
into force. Id.  
176 Id. 
177 Id. art. 17.2. 
178 Id. 
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continue to be subject to the conditions and safeguards of the agreement.179 
Each party bears its own costs arising from the operation of the agreement.180 
V.  HOW PROSECUTORS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CAN 
OBTAIN REMOTELY STORED DATA181 
A.  Search Warrants and Digital Evidence  
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects . . . and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause 
. . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”182 Generally speaking, the probable cause element of 
the Fourth Amendment is met when the affiant describes why, in their 
training and experience, digital evidence will be found in the place to be 
searched and is relevant to the crime under investigation.183 While the 
standard is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the items sought must 
have a nexus to the place being searched, with a “fair probability,” based on 
common sense, that said items will be found in the location.184 
The items to be searched equally must be sufficiently described to 
avoid the government from unfettered searches of a location not otherwise 
relevant to the crime under investigation.185 Because digital evidence can 
physically be contained on thumb drives the size of a thumbnail and 
obfuscated by digital “booby traps,” the warrant may necessitate an extensive 
search of the device limited by the crime.186 
There equally must be a finding that the evidence sought will be at 
the location when law enforcement conducts its search. Unlike guns and 
drugs, which are easily disposed of by a criminal, digital evidence is “not the 
type of evidence that rapidly dissipates or degrades”187 when located on a 
physical device: 
When you delete a file, it goes into a “trash” folder, and 
when you direct the computer to “empty” the trash folder 
                                                           
179 Id. art. 17.3. 
180 Id. art. 13. 
181 Case studies included in this section and throughout this publication are works of fiction. 
Names, characters, entities, places, and incidents either are products of the author’s 
imagination or are used fictitiously. Any resemblance to actual events or locales or persons, 
living or dead, is entirely coincidental. 
182 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
183 United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
184 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).  
185 United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990). 
186 Id. at 845 (“[F]ew people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked 
‘drug records.’”).  
187 United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 529 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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the contents of the folder, including the deleted file, 
disappear. But the file hasn’t left the computer. The trash 
folder is a waste-paper basket; it has no drainage pipe to 
the outside. The file seems to have vanished only because 
the computer has removed it from the user interface and 
so the user can’t “see” it any more.188 
As Judge Posner observed in Seiver, it is possible that the file could 
be overwritten if the hard drive of the computer is exhausted.189 To 
accomplish this task, however, the user would have to exhaust the significant 
size of modern hard drives. Even if overwritten, common sense dictates that 
the basic user of digital devices saves their data on a cloud or external hard 
drive, thus evidence still likely exists at the location where law enforcement 
seeks it. Consequently, though there are multiple possibilities that data 
could be encrypted, overwritten, or wiped, “rarely will [these possibilities] 
be so probable as to destroy probable cause.”190 Judge Posner further 
observed that: 
No doubt after a very long time, the likelihood that the 
defendant still has the computer, and if he does that the file 
hasn’t been overwritten, or if he’s sold it that the current 
owner can be identified, drops to a level at which probable 
cause to search the suspect’s home for the computer can 
no longer be established. But seven months is too short a 
period to reduce the probability that a computer search will 
be fruitful to a level at which probable cause has 
evaporated. . . . The most important thing to keep in mind 
for future cases is the need to ground inquiries into 
“staleness” and “collectors” in a realistic understanding of 
modern computer technology and the usual behavior of its 
users.191 
Judge Posner’s rationale has been met with significant approval by other 
courts.192 This reasoning, however, should not suggest that probable cause 
to search a location or device will never go stale but that law enforcement 
should sufficiently articulate the fact that remnants of data are not easily 
destroyed over time.  
                                                           
188 United States v. Seiver, 692 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2012). 
189 Id. at 777. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 777–78. 
192 See United States v. Valley, 755 F.3d 581, 586–87 (2014) (“But as Seiver makes clear . . . 
investigators looking for digital evidence can assume it remains on the hard drive because 
modern computers by default retain the data.”); United States v. Carroll, 750 F.3d 700, 707 
(2014) (applying Judge Posner’s analysis in rejecting a staleness challenge to the search of 
Carroll’s digital devices for child sexual abuse material, despite a delay of sixty months). 
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 In reviewing affidavits, prosecutors must ensure that warrant 
applications adequately describe the location to be searched, what evidence 
may be found at the location and where it may be found, and why it would 
be found there despite the passage of time.193 These descriptions must be 
based on a realistic understanding of technology, not mere rumor or 
happenstance.194 Prosecutors must be mindful that data may not be stored 
on a device but rather held by a cloud service provider. Unlike the physical 
digital device, data can be easily deleted from cloud storage. This 
information, if preserved by the mechanisms described in the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, allows law enforcement to ensure key data is 
not deleted. 
B. Obtaining Domestically Stored Data 
Currently, the most frequent remote data storage scenarios facing 
United States law enforcement involve the need to acquire data stored on a 
server somewhere in the United States. Since data storage continues to 
proliferate in frequency and sophistication, this may not always be the 
case.195 Regardless of the server’s location, however, legal process should be 
directed to the internet service provider, not the individual server’s location.  
This is logical for several reasons. First, the prospect of law 
enforcement serving legal process on the location of a server is unrealistic 
since law enforcement will lack knowledge of the server’s location, and the 
provider may move the data at any time. Second, data can be stored 
anywhere; servers often exist across national boundaries and around the 
world.196 Third, data is often not stored in any one location. The common 
practice of sharding involves splitting up data and distributing it among 
multiple locations.197  
International law recognizes and addresses data location concerns. 
The Convention on Cyber Crime, or Budapest Convention, mandates that 
all signatory countries maintain the ability to use legal processes to compel 
companies to produce electronic data they control, even when the company 
                                                           
193 Id.  
194 Id.  
195 See generally infra Section V.E. 
196 See infra Section V.E. 
197 Jeeyoung Kim, How Sharding Works, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2014), 
https://medium.com/@jeeyoungk/how-sharding-works-b4dec46b3f6 
[https://perma.cc/T469-RRTR]. For an important analysis of forensic science concerns in 
cloud computing ecosystems, see MARTIN HERMAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
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stores the data in another country.198 The Department of Justice has noted 
that the CLOUD Act “makes explicit in U.S. law the long-established U.S. 
and international principle that a company subject to a country’s jurisdiction 
can be required to produce data the company controls, regardless of where 
it is stored at any point in time.”199 
Given the irrelevance of the data’s location, law enforcement must 
identify the relevant internet-service provider(s) with access to the desired 
evidence and immediately send a letter of preservation. The SCA mandates 
that upon a governmental entity’s request, a provider “shall take all 
necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession,” 
pending further legal process.200 This initial request is valid for ninety days 
and may be extended for an additional ninety days.201 Preserving data is a 
critical tool to prevent destruction or loss of evidence while obtaining 
additional legal authority. Investigators or prosecutors failing to take this step 
unnecessarily compromise critical evidence in criminal cases, potentially by 
a suspect’s overt acts, such as deleting content or accounts or using remote 
wiping programs or signals, or automated actions of the service provider, 
such as routine deletion processes.202 
After sending a letter of preservation, the appropriate method of 
legal process must be selected. This analysis arguably differs depending on 
whether the prosecutor’s approach is based on a strict textual analysis of the 
SCA or a proactive recognition of the trajectory of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The latter is required to avoid suppression of evidence203 and 
problematic case law, given the trend of privacy-oriented judicial opinions 
and greater scrutiny of law enforcement’s reliance on traditional Fourth 
Amendment doctrines.204  
For a strict textual analysis, guidance for legal process is found in 
the SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. Multiple methods of legal process are 
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2703 depending on the circumstances. More 
specifically, if the information sought is the contents of a wire or electronic 
                                                           
198 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime art. 21, opened for signature Nov. 23, 2001, 
C.E.T.S. No. 185 (entered into force Jan. 7, 2004). For an official list of participating 
countries, see Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185: Convention on Cyber 
Crime, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/185/signatures?p_auth=cmPs1otx [https://perma.cc/83D4-EQA8]; see 
also THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36.  
199 THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36.  
200 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (2018).  
201 Id. § 2703(f)(2). 
202 “A remote wipe generally refers to the deleting of data on a device . . . . During a remote 
wipe, the deletion is triggered from a remote system endpoint.” Remote Wipe, 
TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/10352/remote-wipe 
[https://perma.cc/3WCJ-X7ZB].  
203 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2209–10 (2018). 
204 See supra Section II.C. 
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communication and has been in electronic storage for 180 days or less, § 
2703(a) requires a search warrant pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure or in “[s]tate court, issued using [s]tate warrant procedures . . . 
.”205 These search warrants must be issued “by a court of competent 
jurisdiction,” whether state or federal.206 The SCA defines this broadly as “a 
court of general criminal jurisdiction of a [s]tate authorized by the law of that 
[s]tate to issue search warrants . . . .”207 
If the information is the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, and it has resided in electronic storage for more than 180 
days, § 2703(b) applies and permits a couple of options for legal process. 
The first of these is a search warrant using the same procedures as those 
listed in § 2703(a). The second option is by obtaining an administrative 
subpoena208 or a court order under § 2703(d). Any “court of competent 
jurisdiction”209 may issue 2703(d) orders. The thresholds for obtaining 
subpoenas and 2703(d) orders are lower than probable cause; to obtain a 
2703(d) order, law enforcement must offer “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the information 
sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”210 This 
lower standard has great significance, as demonstrated by the outcome and 
analysis of the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States.211 
Notably, the SCA does not require notice to the account holder 
when law enforcement uses legal process to access account content. 
However, a specific provision of the SCA permits delaying the legal process 
notification to the account holder if requested by law enforcement and 
approved by a court issuing an order to delay the notification.212 In light of 
privacy-oriented judicial trajectories and the risk of evidence loss, law 
enforcement officers should err on the side of caution and always include a 
delay in notification application and court order authorizing delayed notice 
to an account holder. A court may delay the notification for a period of 
ninety days.213 In ongoing investigations, law enforcement may request that 
a court extend the notification delay in increments of additional ninety days 
upon application and court order.214  
                                                           
205 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2018). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. § 2711(3)(B). 
208 Administrative subpoenas must be “authorized by a [f]ederal or [s]tate statute or a [f]ederal 
or [s]tate grand jury or trial subpoena.” Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i).  
209 Id. § 2703(d). 
210 Id. 
211 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
212 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2018). 
213 Id.  
214 Id.  
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If law enforcement is seeking to obtain non-content records of 
electronic communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) authorizes four methods: 
“consent of the subscriber or customer,” subpoena, 2703(d) order, or 
search warrant.215 Non-content records may include the subscriber’s name; 
address, telephonic session times and durations; length of service including 
start dates and service types; telephone number and other subscriber 
identifiers; and the means and payment sources for the account.216 Obtaining 
this information by subpoena often provides critical leads and corroboration 
for law enforcement. Examples include establishing a suspect’s identity in 
the early stages of investigation and obtaining information to satisfy the 
probable cause threshold necessary for search warrants requesting 
authorization to examine communication contents. Google’s subpoena 
returns provide an excellent example of the information law enforcement 
may uncover using a subpoena. Generally, the Google subpoena response 
may include names, phone numbers, and email addresses associated with 
the Google account; time and date of last logins; and specific IP addresses 
used, among other information. Equally enlightening, the return also lists 
any Google services used by that subscriber, such as Google Calendar, 
Google Photos, and location history. Individually or collectively, the 
subscribers’ Google services data could corroborate allegations or provide 
specific Google products to target with a search warrant.217  
Even though multiple methods of obtaining content exist under § 
2703(b), a search warrant is the most appropriate option. From a practical 
standpoint, in many cases, investigators possessing specific and articulable 
facts sufficient to meet § 2703(d)’s threshold are most likely able to meet 
the probable cause threshold to secure a search warrant. For law 
enforcement confronted with the choice of using either a § 2703(d) order 
or a search warrant, a search warrant is the wiser option. Data secured 
through a search warrant supported by probable cause flips the burden to a 
defendant to demonstrate a basis for declaring the search warrant invalid 
and suppressing the evidence.  
The trajectory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence illustrates the 
wisdom of the maxim “When in doubt, get a search warrant,”218 evidencing 
greater sensitivity to privacy concerns, even in the context of long-established 
                                                           
215 Id. § 2703(c)(1). 
216 Id. § 2703(c)(2). 
217 Information represented by Google in August 2020. Google made these representations 
during a workshop presented for the 2020 Crimes Against Children Conference. The 
workshop itself is no longer accessible at cacconference.org, but the workshop was attended 
by the author(s), and the information is consistent with the authors’ prosecutorial practice. 
This is a critical practice pointer that unfortunately most prosecutors (and other attorneys) 
are unaware of.  
218 See supra Part II.  
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and rarely-questioned doctrines. In several prior cases, the United States 
Supreme Court “held repeatedly” information conveyed to a third party, 
even if only for a “limited purpose” or in “confidence,” enjoyed no Fourth 
Amendment protection.219 The prior decisions ruled a person lacked a 
reasonable “expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to 
third parties.”220  
As integration of technology in daily life became ubiquitous, 
however, courts began to develop and apply heightened Fourth 
Amendment protections. In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court 
prohibited warrantless cell phone searches, “even when a cell phone is 
seized incident to arrest.”221 The Court reasoned that cell phones “are not 
just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they 
may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”222  
The Carpenter Court applied a similar privacy-oriented analysis to 
impose a new search warrant supported by probable cause threshold to 
obtain cell site location information (CSLI).223 In that case, law enforcement 
used a § 2703(d) order to obtain CSLI data.224 The Court specifically 
rejected the third-party doctrine’s application to CSLI data, holding that the 
context of CSLI being “gathered by a third party does not make it any less 
deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”225 The Court concluded that 
the use of the § 2703(d) order’s lower threshold of “specific and articulable 
facts” failed to satisfy an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
data.226 Contradictory to the legal process provisions within the SCA, 
especially § 2703(b), the decision eviscerates a court order’s effectiveness to 
obtain transactional data.  
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Warshak227 
exemplifies the peril of relying on the SCA’s legal process provisions to 
obtain communications content. In Warshak, law enforcement sent a letter 
of preservation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) and followed up with legal 
process—specifically, an administrative subpoena as authorized by the text 
of § 2703(b) for disclosure of emails over 180 days old.228 Contrary to the 
SCA’s procedural mandates, the Sixth Circuit found that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy existed in the emails’ content obtained by law 
                                                           
219 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
220 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2209 (2018) (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 435; 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
221 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). 
222 Id. at 403 (citation omitted). 
223 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209–10. 
224 Id. at 2212. 
225 Id. at 2223. 
226 Id. at 2209, 2212. 
227 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
228 Id. at 283; see 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2018). 
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enforcement and imposed a warrant requirement.229 The Warshak court 
ruled that the Fourth Amendment required law enforcement to procure a 
search warrant authorizing the examination of the emails’ content.230 The 
court rejected the SCA’s delineation in § 2703(b) of legal process categories; 
the length of email storage was irrelevant to the court’s analysis.231 The 
Warshak court determined law enforcement’s failure to use a search 
warrant to access the email content violated the Fourth Amendment.232 
Additionally, the court found the relevant portion of the SCA was 
unconstitutional.233 
When the remote computing service or electronic communications 
service refuses to honor the issued legal process, the prosecutor should 
zealously advocate for enforcing the subpoena, court order, or search 
warrant.234 As the chief law enforcement officer in the jurisdiction, a 
prosecutor has a duty to investigate the basis for the legal objection, engage 
in negotiations, and, where appropriate, secure the production of the 
requested records through a motion to compel or order to show cause.  
Whether a case resides in federal or state court, the judiciary 
possesses the inherent authority to compel and sanction a party for 
noncompliance with a lawfully served subpoena, court order, or search 
warrant. The judiciary’s elemental power emanates from constitutional, 
statutory, and court-developed rules—without which, a court would be 
powerless over the attorneys or litigants who appear before the bench. A 
subpoenaed party may seek relief from the judge when there is reason to 
question a document’s validity or the authority to issue the subpoena. A 
party failing to request judicial review usurps judicial authority, potentially 
acting contemptuously. If this standard applies to subpoenas, then the same 
reasoning retains even greater import when an ex parte modification to a 
search warrant occurs.235  
                                                           
229 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286. 
230 Id. at 288. 
231 Id. 
232 Id.  
233 Id. 
234 For instance, an ISP/ESP has no right to stand in the shoes of their customer and assert a 
right of privacy in response to a validly issued warrant. See In re 381 Search Warrants to 
Facebook, Inc., 78 N.E.3d 141, 143, 153 (N.Y. 2017). The ISP/ESP has a limited right to 
review in a subpoena/court order. Id. at 147–49.   
235 Service provider remedies are often limited in the context of search warrants. See id. at 
145–49 (finding that an order denying Facebook’s motion to quash a search warrant was not 
appealable). 
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1. Costs Associated with Obtaining the Data 
In exchange for producing the data, a remote computing service or 
electronic communications service may seek reimbursement for costs 
“directly incurred in searching for, assembling, reproducing, or otherwise 
providing such information.”236 The amount of such reimbursement shall be 
mutually agreed upon by the government and the remote computing service 
and/or electronic communications service.237 If the parties do not reach an 
agreement, the court, where the legal process originated or where the 
criminal action commences, shall decide the amount of reimbursement 
owed.238  
 Interestingly, 18 U.S.C. § 2706(c) exempts communications 
common carriers from seeking cost reimbursement from law enforcement 
for telephone toll records and telephone listings.239 When Congress enacted 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986, Congress did not 
intend to compensate service providers for the costs of routine requests for 
subscriber and toll information.240 
 Since the SCA’s passage in 1986, technology advanced from the 
basic days of dial-up internet services Prodigy, CompuServe, and Juno to 
Google and Yahoo. Likewise, the legal process for subscriber information, 
internet protocol logs, and content increased.241 With the growth of 
technology, remote computing service, and electronic communication 
service, providers have expanded legal compliance departments and 
leveraged technology to access data for the consumer’s benefit as well as 
accommodate the increase in legal process for subscriber information, 
internet protocol logs, and content.242 This increase in legal process is likely 
attributable to the increased use of technology to commit a crime. Arguably, 
the statutory intent in exempting common communications carriers from 
seeking cost reimbursement from law enforcement for telephone toll 
records and telephone listings may now apply for a majority of legal 
                                                           
236 18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2018) (emphasis added).  
237 Id. § 2706(b). 
238 Id.  
239 Id. § 2706(c). 
240 See Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 693 F. Supp. 542, 544 (E.D. Mich. 1988). 
241 See, e.g., Dropbox Legal Transparency Report, DROPBOX,  
https://www.dropbox.com/transparency/reports [https://perma.cc/P58A-2ND9]; Google 
Transparency Report: Requests for User Information, GOOGLE, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview [https://perma.cc/4HCW-7H55]; 
Verizon Media Government Data Requests, VERIZON MEDIA, 
https://www.verizonmedia.com/transparency/reports/government-data-requests.html 
[https://perma.cc/6EU7-Y2WB]. 
242 See, e.g., Dropbox Legal Transparency Report, supra note 243; Google Transparency 
Report: Requests for User Information, supra note 243; Verizon Media Government Data 
Requests, supra note 243. 
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demands to remote computing service and electronic communication 
service providers. 
 The plain wording of 18 U.S.C. § 2706 equally suggests that a 
remote computing service or electronic communication service provider 
cannot withhold data pending payment.243 Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 2706 states 
that “a governmental entity . . . shall pay . . . a fee for reimbursement for 
such costs . . . directly incurred in . . . providing such information.”244 The 
use of the past tense in the word incurred, coupled with the present tense 
usage of the word reimbursement,245 indicates that the records already have 
been produced for a duly served piece of legal process. 
What is more, the plain wording refers to expenses directly related 
to the production.246 Providers should not be permitted to obtain financial 
benefits beyond the intent of 18 U.S.C. § 2706, and prosecutors or law 
enforcement receiving an inordinate bill from a service provider should 
avail themselves of the court of original jurisdiction to resolve the disputed 
amount. 
 The following hypothetical illustrates the process of obtaining 
remotely-stored data on servers within the United States.247 John, a forty-
three-year-old man residing in Midgard (the newest state admitted to the 
United States), began texting with a fourteen-year-old female, Stacy, after 
ending his relationship with Stacy’s mom. John sent Stacy explicit chats, 
resulting in John asking Stacy to meet him for a sexual encounter. During 
the in-person meeting, John committed several sex acts against Stacy, all of 
which John recorded using his nPhone. In addition to John’s nPhone saving 
pictures and videos directly to the phone, John configured his nPhone to 
automatically save a duplicate of any photo or video created with the phone 
to John’s nCloud account. nCloud is a cloud-based storage service owned 
and operated by Nectarine. Nectarine is a company headquartered in 
California, and Nectarine servers (which host the nCloud data) are in 
Virginia. John, suspecting the police knew about his criminal acts with Stacy, 
performed a factory reset of his nPhone, destroying all data (including chats 
and photos) on his nPhone. 
However, performing the factory reset did not remove the photos 
or chats from John’s nCloud account, and John did not delete the data from 
                                                           
243 See H. MARSHALL JARRETT, MICHAEL W. BAILIE, ED HAGEN & NATHAN JUDISH, 
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 127 (2009) (“Section 2703 offers five mechanisms that a 
“government entity” can use to compel a provider to disclose certain kinds of information.”).  
244 18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
245 “[T]he act of paying back money to someone who has spent it for you or lost it because of 
you, or the amount that is paid back.” Reimbursement, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/reimbursement 
[https://perma.cc/HT5S-WRD9]. 
246 18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2018). 
247 See supra Part I. 
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his nCloud account. Following Stacy’s disclosure to her guidance counselor, 
the police learned of John’s manipulation and sexual assault. Officer Kay 
Oss, of the Midgard State Police, responded to the guidance counselor’s 
report and opened an investigation. Officer Oss wants to obtain the chats 
and photos from John’s nCloud account. Officer Oss is uncertain what legal 
process to use since the servers are in Virginia and not Midgard. 
2. How Should the Midgard Prosecutors Advise Officer Oss? 
 Officer Oss should immediately send a letter of preservation to 
Nectarine. If Officer Oss is unsure where and how to send the preservation 
letter, she could access an investigative resource such as search.org, 
specifically SEARCH’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) List; ask her local 
prosecutor; or ask a colleague on Listserv. Officer Oss could likely access 
the company’s contact information, including email, phone, and address 
information from the ISP List. The ISP List contains additional information 
for contacting the appropriate personnel at Nectarine. The critical address 
for serving legal process on a company providing communication services 
is the location of the company’s corporate headquarters, not the physical 
location of servers, which is typically unknown to law enforcement. Once 
received by the company, the preservation letter secures the target data for 
ninety days, with a possible extension of an additional ninety days.248 Officer 
Oss may now focus on drafting the appropriate legal process. 
 In the initial hypothetical, Officer Oss limits her data requests to 
chats and photographs. Even so, she would be wise to take a much broader 
view of the potential digital evidence available to her. For example, a 
subpoena for non-content subscriber information may reveal other 
Nectarine services John uses, IP addresses, sources of payment, different 
phone numbers, or email addresses associated with the account. All this 
information may lead to additional incriminating information, contraband, 
and other potential corroboration. Nectarine may also retain location 
information about John’s nPhone. Based on the Carpenter decision 
rationale, caution mandates Officer Oss to use a search warrant to request 
location data. The mere inclusion of slight location information is not 
necessarily fatal to a subpoena or § 2703(d) order. Yet, the Carpenter Court 
fired a cautionary flare by distinguishing traditional “business records that 
might incidentally reveal location information” from the CSLI records in 
Carpenter, which included the collection of thousands of data points with 
location information.249 
 For brevity’s sake, we will focus on the potential chats and 
photographs. These data types constitute wire or electronic communication 
content, so Officer Oss should follow the old mantra, “when in doubt, get a 
                                                           
248 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(2) (2018). 
249 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
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search warrant.” Midgard’s state laws do not prohibit the issuance of SCA 
warrants to out-of-state entities by one of Midgard’s many courts of 
competent jurisdiction. While drafting the follow-up legal process to secure 
account information, Officer Oss should also request delayed notice to the 
subscriber regarding any request for data. While pursuing this data, Officer 
Oss should consider statute of limitations issues and tolling options.250 
C. Obtaining Internationally Stored Data via CLOUD Act Agreement 
After her rousing success in the above hypothetical case, Officer 
Oss transferred to an investigative position in Jotunheim, recently admitted 
as the fifty-third state. Her first case involved Marv Springstein, who 
downloaded and compiled an extensive collection of child sexual abuse 
material. Springstein stored this material in an online cloud account 
managed by LockBox, a United States corporation. Springstein was 
extremely careful to avoid storing any information in his digital devices or 
vehicles. Officer Oss immediately sent a preservation letter to LockBox and 
followed up with a search warrant issued by a Jotunheim magistrate. 
LockBox informed Officer Oss that all its servers are in the United 
Kingdom, outside the United States’ jurisdiction. 
1. Can Officer Oss Access This Information, and if So, How? 
This fact pattern emerges from the circumstances presented in 
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,251 where the government sought an SCA 
warrant to require Microsoft to produce all emails and information 
associated with an account hosted by Microsoft.252 The CLOUD Act 
clarified that, subject to exceptions, if the requested data is in the possession 
or control of a United States corporation, organization, or legal person, SCA 
warrants must be honored, even if the data is stored overseas.253 
Clearly, Officer Kay Oss is on firm footing in obtaining this data 
since the United Kingdom is the first nation to enter into a bilateral 
agreement with the United States, as envisioned by the CLOUD Act.254 
Agreements are permissible “only to obtain information relating to . . . 
                                                           
250 See infra Section V.D. 
251 See supra Section III.A.; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
252 In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corporation, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186. 
253 See generally Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, H.R. 4943, 115th Cong. (2018) 
(enacted), https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1152896/download 
[https://perma.cc/KQH5-N9QT] [hereinafter CLOUD Act]. 
254 U.S. and UK Sign Landmark Cross-Border Data Access Agreement to Combat Criminals 
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serious crime,” a term that is not defined by the CLOUD Act, aside from 
noting that “terrorism” is included.255 Fortunately, the United Kingdom 
bilateral agreement defines “serious crime” as crime that carries “a 
maximum sentence of at least three (3) years imprisonment.”256 As in the 
CLOUD Act, no specific crimes are listed aside from terrorism.257 
Springstein’s “extensive collection” of child sexual abuse material should 
meet this threshold. While pursuing this data, Officer Oss should consider 
statute of limitations issues and tolling options.258 
It should be noted that the CLOUD Act “supplements rather than 
eliminates” MLATs, which remain “another method by which evidence” 
may be made available.259 
One significant change created by the CLOUD Act involved 
amending the SCA to enable service providers to move to modify or quash 
SCA warrants. “Court[s] may modify or quash the legal process”260 upon 
request by providers, if the court determines: (1) that compliance with 
process would violate the laws of a “qualifying foreign government;”261 (2) 
that modification or quashing is in the interests of justice based on the 
totality of the circumstances; and (3) that the target of legal process is not a 
United States person or resident.262 The CLOUD Act also mandates an 
eight-factor comity analysis in determining the interests of justice.263 
                                                           
255 THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 5. 
256 See supra Part IV. 
257 CLOUD Act, supra note 255, at 16. 
258 See infra Section V.D. 
259 THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 11. 
260 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2)(B) (2018). 
261 “Qualifying foreign government” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(1)(A) (2018) as a 
foreign government “with which the United States has an executive agreement that has 
entered into force under” 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2018). The foreign government must also 
maintain laws “which provide to electronic communication service providers and remote 
computing service providers substantive and procedural opportunities similar to those 
provided” in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2) (2018) (“Motions to Quash or Modify”) and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(h)(5) (2018) (“Disclosure to Qualifying Foreign Governments”). 
262 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h) (2018) (“Comity Analysis and Disclosure of Information Regarding 
Legal Process Seeking Contents of Wire or Electronic Communication”). 
263 Id. § 2703(h)(3)(A)–(H).  
(A) the interests of the United States, including the investigative interests 
of the governmental entity seeking to require the disclosure; (B) the 
interests of the qualifying foreign government in preventing any 
prohibited disclosure; (C) the likelihood, extent, and nature of penalties 
to the provider or any employees of the provider as a result of 
inconsistent legal requirements imposed on the provider; (D) the 
location and nationality of the subscriber or customer whose 
communications are being sought, if known, and the nature and extent 
of the subscriber or customer’s connection to the United States, or if the 
legal process has been sought on behalf of a foreign authority pursuant 
to section 3512, the nature and extent of the subscriber or customer’s 
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Prosecutors should consider the propriety of formal and informal 
approaches to these conflict of law scenarios.264 
D. Obtaining Internationally Stored Data via Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MLAT) 
Officer Oss’s international investigative endeavors continued when 
she arrested Marv Springstein’s brother, Mark Springstein, who also 
maintained an extensive collection of child sexual abuse material. 
Unfortunately, Mark Springstein stored his contraband material in a 
FireBox account instead of LockBox. FireBox is incorporated in the 
country of Muspelheim and does not have a bilateral agreement pursuant 
to the CLOUD Act. Muspelheim maintains a mutual legal assistance treaty 
(MLAT) with the United States. 
1. Can Officer Oss Access This Information in the Absence of a 
CLOUD Act Agreement? 
While Officer Oss is unable to utilize the streamlined CLOUD Act 
process, she could use the MLAT process. As of 2017, sixty-five countries 
had entered into MLAT agreements with the United States, and the 
European Union joined an agreement with the United States establishing 
mutual legal assistance (MLA) mechanisms with all European Union 
member states.265 If Officer Oss were uncertain whether the United States 
had an MLAT with Muspelheim, she could work with her prosecutor to 
                                                           
connection to the foreign authority’s country; (E) the nature and extent 
of the provider’s ties to and presence in the United States; (F) the 
importance to the investigation of the information required to be 
disclosed; (G) the likelihood of timely and effective access to the 
information required to be disclosed through means that would cause 
less serious negative consequences; and (H) if the legal process has been 
sought on behalf of a foreign authority pursuant to section 3512, the 
investigative interests of the foreign authority making the request for 
assistance. 
Id. 
264 See THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 11–16. Additional 
options for prosecutors could include “narrowing or modifying a request to avoid the conflict; 
resolving the conflict through closer inquiry or good-faith negotiation; or making the request 
under an applicable MLAT.” Id. at 16. 
265 Mark Rush & Jared Kephart, Lifting the Veil on the MLAT Process: A Guide to 
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contact the Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) for 
clarity.266 
The United States Attorney’s Manual provides guidance to Officer 
Oss on the specific steps in submitting a treaty request.267 Because each treaty 
is negotiated by and with different parties, the treaties’ content varies greatly, 
regardless of the subject matter. As a result, the United States Attorney’s 
Manual explains that OIA will provide prosecutors with model requests 
based on the specific jurisdiction.268  
Based on this model, prosecutors are encouraged to describe 
“simply and clearly the facts of the case” and “nature of the assistance 
requested” without using technical legal terms, such as “RICO or even 
probable cause.”269 Since most applications will be translated to local 
languages, legal terms may or may not have local equivalencies, even if the 
same legal concepts are utilized.  
Prosecutors should then send this draft to OIA, which will either 
finalize the request or return to the prosecutor for needed changes. The 
“central authority” of all treaties currently in force is the Department of 
Justice, which leads to the request being signed in the Department and not 
by a judge.270 Following signature, translation is arranged, and upon receipt 
of translation, OIA transmits the MLAT request to the foreign “central 
authority.”271  
Following receipt of the request, Muspelhiem will process the 
request according to its pertinent domestic law and acquire the necessary 
court authority to access Mark Springstein’s FireBox account. Assuming the 
Muspelheim judicial system grants the order, then local Muspelheim 
authorities acquire the resulting data and send it to Officer Oss.272 
The acquired evidence must still pass standard evidentiary 
thresholds to be admissible in court. Prosecutors should also prospectively 
consider attempting to toll the relevant statute of limitations when they 
initiate legal process, given the long time frames often involved in locating 
and receiving evidence from foreign countries. At the federal level, 
                                                           




268 A sample request is provided in the Appendix. 
269 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 281 (2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-281-drafting-requests-
assistance [https://perma.cc/WS5X-HJED]. “RICO” refers to the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-452, 84 Stat. 922; 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.  
270 See JUSTICE MANUAL § 276, supra note 268. 
271 Id. 
272 See THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 3.  
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prosecutors are empowered to file applications with district courts to 
suspend the running of the statute of limitations. Applications are granted 
when the court makes a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the government made an “official request”273 to obtain foreign evidence, and 
it “reasonably appears, or reasonably appeared” when the request was 
made, that the evidence would be found in the foreign country.274 
Importantly, the suspension has limited duration.275 
E. Obtaining Internationally Stored Data Without MLATs or CLOUD 
Act Agreements 
As Officer Oss’s career continued, she encountered a similar 
scenario while investigating another distributor of child sexual abuse 
material, Mike Springstein. Officer Oss’s investigation uncovered significant 
evidence that Mike’s contraband material is stored on his cloud account 
within the Icebox social media platform. Icebox is incorporated in 
Niffelheim, a nation which does not have a CLOUD Act or MLAT 
agreement with the United States. Prior negotiations over these specific 
agreements have been unproductive due to diplomatic tension over 
numerous human rights violations throughout Niffelheim. 
1. Does Officer Oss Have Any Legal Process Options in the 
Absence of Both Agreements? 
First, Officer Oss should consider that CLOUD Act and MLAT 
agreements are not the only categories of relevant international agreements; 
numerous interim executive agreements exist with several countries.276 
Accordingly, Officer Oss should contact the United States OIA to 
determine what agreements and options may exist to determine optimal 
instruments and approaches in this geopolitical context.277  
                                                           
273 “As used in this section, the term ‘official request’ means a letter rogatory, a request under 
a treaty or convention, or any other request for evidence made by a court of the United States 
or an authority of the United States having criminal law enforcement responsibility, to a court 
or other authority of a foreign country.” 18 U.S.C. § 3292(d) (2018). 
274 Id. § 3292(a)(1). 
275 Id. § 3292(c) (“The total of all periods of suspension under this section with respect to an 
offense— (1) shall not exceed three years; and (2) shall not extend a period within which a 
criminal case must be initiated for more than six months if all foreign authorities take final 
action before such period would expire without regard to this section.”). 
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In all cases, prosecutors must first “determine the jurisdiction from 
which assistance is needed.”278 Since assistance from foreign jurisdictions 
typically “depends on the existence of articulable facts,” indicating the 
evidence’s presence within the foreign jurisdiction, prosecutors should be 
prepared to state this information.279  
Officer Oss should not assume the complete absence of treaties or 
executive agreements, but even in such a scenario, letters rogatory may 
provide a solution. A letter rogatory is a request from a US judge to a foreign 
country’s judiciary, requesting an act which “would constitute a violation of 
that country’s sovereignty[]”280 if performed without the foreign court’s 
consent.  
While letters rogatory are typically delivered through diplomatic 
channels, a more efficient method is “by transmitting a copy of the request 
through Interpol” or other direct route.281 A rogatory letter’s form and 
content varies depending on the recipient country; thus, prosecutors should 
consult with the United States OIA throughout the drafting process.282 The 
United States Attorney’s Manual provides helpful procedural steps for 
letters rogatory.283 The Department of Justice estimates that the letters 
                                                           








282 Id.  
Letters rogatory generally include: (1) background (who is investigating 
whom and for what charge); (2) the facts (enough information about the 
case for the foreign judge to conclude that a crime has been committed 
and to see the relevance of the evidence that is being sought); (3) 
assistance requested (be specific but include an elastic clause to allow 
subsequent expansion of the request without filing an additional letter 
rogatory); (4) the text of the statutes alleged to have been violated; and 
(5) a promise of reciprocity. Letters rogatory must be signed by a judge 
and, normally, authenticated by (1) an apostille, (2) an exemplification 
certificate, (3) a chain certificate of authentication, or (4) as directed by 
OIA. If the requested state has ratified the Hague Convention 
Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization of Foreign Public 
Documents, it is preferable to use an apostille. The chain certification is 
a cumbersome process involving authentication by the Department of 
Justice, the Department of State, and the embassy of the foreign country 
to which the letter rogatory is directed. Consult OIA to ascertain which 
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rogatory method of assistance can take a year or more,284 so prosecutors 
should strongly consider statute of limitations issues and tolling options in 
this context.285  
Officer Oss could also attempt various “informal means” of 
obtaining evidence from Niffelheim, though she should recognize that some 
methods may not yield admissible evidence.286 These could include asking 
foreign authorities to open an investigation and share evidence; requesting 
that foreign jurisdictions provide public records to United States law 
enforcement; conducting “depositions of voluntary witnesses” 287 at United 
States embassies and consulates; making treaty requests; using informal 
requests between law enforcement agencies; and sending requests through 
Interpol for evidence or information.288 
The Convention on Cybercrime, or “Budapest Convention,” is a 
critical international agreement that has been ratified by sixty-five countries 
                                                           
First, obtain a model from OIA [Office of International Affairs] and 
check with OIA to ascertain the requirements of the particular country. 
Second, prepare a draft . . . and send it to OIA for clearance. Third, 
secure a judge’s signature. Submit the cleared final to the district court 
in two originals under cover of an application for issuance of letters 
rogatory and a memorandum in support, models of which have been 
obtained from OIA. One signed original letter rogatory remains with the 
court. Fourth, authenticate as directed by OIA. Unless OIA has 
instructed you differently, affix an apostille or other authentication to the 
signed duplicate original and send it and two copies to OIA. Fifth, make 
arrangements for translation . . . and send the duplicate original with 
translation to OIA, which will transmit it to the Department of State, the 
American Embassy in the country concerned, or directly to the 
appropriate ministry or authority in the country concerned. If OIA 
transmits the letter rogatory with translation via the diplomatic channel, 
the Embassy will send it to the Foreign Ministry under cover of a 
diplomatic note, the Foreign Ministry will usually refer it to the Ministry 
of Justice, and the Ministry of Justice will usually forward it to the proper 
judicial authority where it will be executed. Normally, the evidence, once 
obtained, is returned through the same channel by which the request 
was transmitted. In some cases, the request is sent to an attorney in the 
foreign jurisdiction who is retained to present the request, obtain the 
evidence, and deliver it to the United States. 
Id.  
284 Id. 
285 See supra Section V.D. 
286 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 274 (2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-274-methods 
[https://perma.cc/YFS5-GXZ5]. 
287 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 278 (2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-278-informal-means 
[https://perma.cc/A78T-CH6R]. 
288 Id. (referencing current known locations or suspect photographs). 
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as of April 2020.289 The prolific adoption of the Budapest Convention is 
cause for optimism by Officer Oss, particularly if Niffelheim is a signatory, 
since all parties are required to adopt domestic law “under which relevant 
authorities can compel providers in their territory to disclose electronic data 
in their possession or control.”290 Even so, the Budapest Convention does 
not include an exception for “data that a company controls but chooses to 
store abroad.”291 
F. Legal Implications of Extraterrestrial Data Storage 
Data storage—and even the provision of internet service itself—is 
increasingly explored in the context of satellites. For example, SpaceX has 
launched over 700 StarLink satellites and obtained approval for 12,000 
satellites.292 This phenomenon is so prevalent; optical and radio astronomers 
are concerned because of satellites’ obstruction of telescopes.293  
Several private entities have entered the industry of space-based 
data storage.294 SpaceBelt describes itself as a “Cloud Constellation 
Corporation” that is “leading the cloud transformation of space.”295 
SpaceBelt offers increases in data security and convenience as selling 
points.296 Some companies anticipate energy benefits because solar radiation 
                                                           
289 Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185, 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?docume
ntId=0900001680081561 [https://perma.cc/CL23-Z238]. The official list of party countries 
is available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/185/signatures?p_auth=cmPs1otx [https://perma.cc/7PS5-8AKB]. 
290 THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 7; see Convention on 
Cybercrime, supra note 291, at 9 (mandating each signatory to “adopt such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to order . . . a 
person in its territory to submit specified computer data in that person’s possession or 
control, which is stored in a computer system or a computer-data storage medium”). 
291 THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 7. 
292 Daniel Clery, Starlink Already Threatens Optical Astronomy. Now, Radio Astronomers 




294 See generally Yevgeniy Sverdlik, Space: The Ultimate Network Edge, DATACENTER 
KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2016/10/17/space-the-ultimate-network-
edge [https://perma.cc/5QY7-82WW]; SPACEBELT, http://spacebelt.com/#about 
[https://perma.cc/TX2F-K5LX]; CONNECTX, https://connectx.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/E9TA-U2QT]. 
295 SPACEBELT, supra note 296. 
296 Id. 
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could power servers at a minimal cost.297 Space itself may provide practical 
advantages for data storage since “the cold of space could allow faster 
processing without the risk of overheating.”298 Some predict significant cost 
savings given the proliferation of terrestrial data centers,299 the economic 
costs of cybersecurity maintenance and breaches of terrestrial 
infrastructure,300 and the decreasing costs of launching satellites into orbit.301 
Extraterrestrial data storage also provides context for additional 
innovation in data delivery. For example, machine learning models can 
predict the best routes for data transmission:  
If you are located in Emeryville, California . . . and it’s a 
cloudy day in the Bay Area, the system will not send the 
signal [from space] directly to Emeryville. Instead, it may 
drop it down further south, say in Sacramento, where the 
sky is clear and from where the data will be routed along 
terrestrial fiber to its intended recipient[.]302  
 Returning to the hypothetical, let us assume that Officer Oss 
opens an investigation of Joe Collector, an eccentric, independently wealthy 
billionaire who maintains various exotic flora and fauna in an increasingly 
crowded menagerie. Aside from discovering numerous Endangered 
Species Act violations, Officer Oss developed probable cause to believe that 
Joe stores another collection of illegal images and videos on a satellite 
currently in Earth’s orbit. At the time Officer Oss sought a search warrant, 
the satellite was in orbit directly above the sovereign nation of Paradise 
Archipelago. Infinity Dust, Inc. launched and maintained the satellite, 
which is based in Midgard, the nation where Oss currently serves as a law 
enforcement officer. When Officer Oss arrested Joe, he was not overly 
concerned. Instead, Joe bragged about how he stores the data in outer 
space—safely beyond the jurisdiction of any terrestrial government. 
                                                           
297 Rick Delgado, Cloud Computing Is Moving to Outer Space?, SMARTDATA COLLECTIVE 
(June 21, 2016), https://www.smartdatacollective.com/cloud-computing-moving-outer-space/ 
[https://perma.cc/LEK9-YVZD]. 
298 Id. 
299 Dan Matthews, Data Storage in Space? It’s Already in the Works, SMARTDATA 
COLLECTIVE (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.smartdatacollective.com/data-storage-space-works/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q3VR-75JX]. 
300 Michael Sheetz, Satellite Start-Up Raises $100 Million to Put Cloud Data Storage in Space, 
CNBC (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/19/cloud-constellation-raises-100-
million-to-store-cloud-data-in-space.html [https://perma.cc/4WZL-Z9NL]. 
301 Delgado, supra note 299. 
302 Sverdlik, supra note 296. 
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1. Can Officer Oss Access Joe Collector’s Data, Despite its Location 
in Outer Space? 
 This hypothetical provides an additional illustration of the 
importance of focusing on the physical location of the corporation 
maintaining the data, as opposed to the actual physical location of the 
targeted data.303 The satellite’s orbital location above Paradise Archipelago 
is irrelevant since the servers’ location—terrestrial or extraterrestrial—is not 
the dispositive consideration for legal process. Rather, Officer Oss should 
direct her attention to the corporation maintaining the relevant data, which 
is in Midgard. An immediate preservation letter should be sent, followed by 
a search warrant. 
  Extraterrestrial data storage implications may receive judicial 
attention in the near future. While the hypothetical based on extraterrestrial 
data storage seems inconceivable, a few entities already marketed 
extraterrestrial data storage to conceal data from governmental actors. For 
example, one extraterrestrial data storage corporation advertises that “‘no 
one can physically access our [satellite] system and no government or entity 
can force the exposure of your information.’”304 Asgardia—a company based 
out of Vienna, Austria—styles itself as the first space-based nation. It 
possesses its own calendar, constitution, parliament, national symbols, and, 
as of November 2017, its own satellite with data storage capabilities, seeking 
to store data “beyond the reach of Earthly laws.”305 While it is beyond this 
Article’s scope to explore international law issues presented by these 
arguments,306 numerous pertinent international law sources and oversight 
have existed since the birth of space exploration.307 
                                                           
303 See supra Section V.B. 
304 Andrew Donoghue, The Idea of Data Centers in Space Just Got a Little Less Crazy, 
DATACENTER KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/edge-
computing/idea-data-centers-space-just-got-little-less-crazy [https://perma.cc/Y9HJ-JDHR]. 
305 Mark Harris, The First Space-Based ‘Nation’ Wants to Store Data Off-Planet, Beyond the 
Law, VICE (June 6, 2017), https://www.vice.com/en/article/a3zveg/asgardia-nation-space-
data-storage-off-planet [https://perma.cc/BKS5-39GW]. Asgardia purports to be a non-
governmental organization based in Vienna, Austria. ASGARDIA THE SPACE NATION, 
https://asgardia.space/en/page/imprint [https://perma.cc/H7HG-UQJ2]. 
306 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 291. 
307 See Yun Zhao, Space Commercialization and the Development of Space Law, OXFORD 
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VI. APPENDIX308 
A. Long-Arm Statutes309 
Alabama: 
ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.2 (Westlaw through Nov. 20, 2020); Butler v. Beer Across 
America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000); Keelean v. Cent. Bank of 
the South, 544 So. 2d 153 (Ala. 1989), overruled by Prof’l Ins. Corp. v. 
Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347 (Ala. 1997)). 
Alaska: 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 32 and Ballot 
Measure 2 of the 2020 Second Reg. Sess. of the 31st Leg.); Kennecorp 
Mortg. & Equities, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Fairbanks, 685 P.2d 1232 (Ala. 
1984). 
Arizona: 
ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.2 (Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2021); Aries v. Palmer 
Johnson, Inc., 735 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Meyers v. Hamilton 
Corp., 693 P.2d 904 (Ariz. 1985). 
Arkansas: 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101 (West, Westlaw through Dec. 15, 2020); 
Pennsalt Chem. Corp. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 426 S.W.2d 417 (Ark. 
1968); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 
1997). 
California: 
CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 410.10 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 13 of 2021 
Reg. Sess); Abbott Power Corp. v. Overhead Elec. Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 508 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002). 
Colorado: 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 16, 2021); 
Waterval v. District Court In & For El Paso County, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo. 
1980). 
Connecticut: 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b (West, Westlaw through Mar. 4, 2021); Gates 
v. Royal Palace Hotel, 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 670 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 
1998); Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 459 A.2d 503 (Conn. 1983). 
                                                           
308 Numerous templates for prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and allied professionals 
are available on the National White-Collar Crime Center (NW3C) and Zero Abuse Project 
websites. See NW3C, INC., nw3c.org [https://perma.cc/TH7X-4XZZ], and ZERO ABUSE 
PROJECT, zeroabuseproject.org [https://perma.cc/5JNY-E5EX] for more information. These 
templates include sample letters of preservation, search warrants and related affidavits, and 
MLAT requests, among other resources. 
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Delaware: 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 7 of the 
151st Gen. Assemb. (2021-2022)); Eudaily v. Harmon, 420 A.2d 1175 (Del. 
1980); Kane v. Coffman, No. 00C-08-236, 2001 WL 914016 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 2001). 
District of Columbia (D.C.): 
D.C. CODE § 13-423 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 3, 2021); Env’t Rsch. 
Int’l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng’rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1975); 
GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 313 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
Florida: 
FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Second Reg. Sess. 
of the 26th Leg.); Homeway Furniture Co. of Mount Airy, Inc. v. Horne, 
822 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
Georgia: 
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2003) (West, Westlaw through 2021, Act 4); 
Beasley v. Beasley, 396 S.E.2d 222 (Ga. 1990). 
Hawaii: 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-35 (West, Westlaw through Act 1 of the 2021 Reg. 
Sess.); Cowan v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, LTD., 608 P.2d 394 (Haw. 1980). 
Idaho: 
IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2021); Schneider 
v. Sverdsten Logging Co., 657 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1983). 
Illinois: 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (Westlaw through P.A. 101-655); Aero 
Products Int’l, Inc. v. Intex Corp., No. 02 C 2590, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17948 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele, 368 N.E.2d 
88 (Ill. 1977). 
Indiana: 
IND. R. TRIAL P. 4.4 (Westlaw through Jan. 15, 2021); Anthem Ins. Cos. 
v. Tenent Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. 2000); 
Communications Depot, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. IP01-1587-
C-H/K, 2002 WL 1800044 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Search Force, Inc. v. 
Dataforce Int’l, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 771 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
Iowa: 
IOWA CODE § 617.3 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 8, 2021); Universal 
Coops., Inc. v. Tasco, Inc., 300 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1981). 
Kansas: 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-36, 210 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.);  
D.J.’s Rock Creek Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Foam & Insulation Mfg. Co., 
No. 01-4139-JAR, 2003 WL 262495 (D. Kan. 2003); Woodring v. Hall, 
438 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1968). 
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Kentucky: 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 60 of the 
2021 Reg. Sess.); Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, LLC, 995 F. 
Supp. 761 (W.D. Ky. 1997); Tube Turns Div. of Chemtron Corp. v. 
Patterson Co., 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
Louisiana: 
LA STAT. ANN. § 13:320 (Westlaw through 2020 Second Extraordinary 
Sess.); Mid City Bowling Lanes & Sports Palace, Inc. v. Ivercrest, Inc., 35 
F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. La. 1999); Petrol. Helicopters, Inc. v. AVCO Corp., 
513 So. 2d 1188 (La. 1987). 
Maine: 
ME. STAT. tit. 14, § 704-A (Westlaw through the 2019 Second Reg. Sess. 
of the 129th Leg.); Talarico v. Marathon Shoe Co., No. CIV 00-239-P-C, 
2001 WL 366346 (D. Me. 2001); Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 
1 (Me. 1979). 
Maryland: 
MD. CODE ANN., COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 6-103 (West, 
Westlaw through Mar. 14, 2021); A. F. Briggs Co. v. Starrett Corp., 329 
A.2d 177 (Me. 1974); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Wilkins, 142 F. Supp. 2d 703 (D. 
Md. 2001). 
Massachusetts: 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (West, Westlaw through February 15, 
2021); Back Bay Farm, LLC v. Collucio, 230 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass. 
2002); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 1994). 
Michigan: 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.705 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2021, No. 3, 
of the 2021 Reg. Sess.); Green v. Wilson, 565 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1997); 
Siebellink v. Cyclone Airsports, Ltd., No. 1:01-CV-591, 2001 WL 1910560 
(W.D. Mich. 2001); Sifers v. Horen, 188 N.W.2d 623 (Mich. 1971); Sports 
Auth. Michigan, Inc. v. Justballs, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 806 (E.D. Mich. 
2000). 
Minnesota: 
MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (2003); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Tennessee 
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 646 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State by 
Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997). 
Mississippi: 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 16, 2021); 
Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Miss. 2001); 
Mladinich v. Kohn, 164 So. 2d 785 (Miss. 1964). 
Missouri: 
MO. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2020 
Second Reg. Sess. and First and Second Extraordinary Sess. of the 100th 
Gen. Assemb.); State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 
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1970); State ex rel. Nixon v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., 29 S.W.3d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2000). 
Montana: 
MONT. R. CIV. P. 4B (Westlaw through Feb. 18, 2021); Bedrejo v. Triple 
E Canada, Ltd., 984 P.2d 739 (Mont. 1999); Simmons v. State, 670 P.2d 
1372 (Mont. 1983). 
Nebraska: 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 18, 2021); Stucky 
v. Stucky, 185 N.W.2d 656 (Neb. 1971); Wagner v. Unicord Corp., 526 
N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 1995). 
Nevada: 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (West, Westlaw Chapter 3 of the 81st Reg. 
Sess.); Certain-Teed Prod. Corp. v. Second Judicial District Court, 479 P.2d 
781 (Nev. 1971); Graziose v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 
1149 (D. Nev. 2001); Trump v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Becker), 857 
P.2d 740 (Nev. 1993). 
New Hampshire: 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510:4 (Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 
Gen. Ct.); Estabrook v. Wetmore, 529 A.2d 956 (N.H. 1987); Phelps v. 
Kingston, 536 A.2d 740 (N.H. 1987); Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221 
(N.H. 2002); Remsbury v. Docusearch, Inc., No. CIV. 00-211-B, 2002 WL 
130952 (D.N.H. Jan. 31, 2002). 
New Jersey: 
N.J. CT. R. R. 4:4–4 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2021); Avdel Corp. v. 
Mecure, 277 A.2d 207 (N.J. 1971); Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equip. 
Corp., 508 A.2d 1127 (N.J. 1986); Ragonese v. Rosenfeld, 722 A.2d 991 
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1998). 
New Mexico: 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 6 of the 1st 
Reg. Sess. of the 55th Leg.); Origins Nat. Res., Inc. v. Kotler, 133 F. Supp. 
2d 1232 (D.N.M. 2001); Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 543 P.2d 825 
(N.M. 1975); Windward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc., 493 P.2d 954 (N.M. 
1972). 
New York: 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2021, Chapters 1 to 49, 
61 to 80); Armouth Int’l, Inc. v. Haband Co., 715 N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2000); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209 
N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965). 
North Carolina: 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (Westlaw through the end of the 2020 Reg. Sess. 
of the Gen. Assemb.); Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 
629 (N.C. 1977); Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 515 S.E.2d 46 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1999). 
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North Dakota: 
N.D. R. Civ. P. 4 (Westlaw through January 15, 2021); Hebron Brick Co. 
v. Robinson Brick & Tile Co., 234 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1975). 
Ohio: 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 115 
of the 133rd Gen. Assemb.); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 
(6th Cir. 1996); U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co. P’ship v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc., 
624 N.E.2d 1048 (Ohio 1994). 
Oklahoma: 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 2 of the First 
Reg. Sess. of the 58th Leg.); Hough v. Leonard, 867 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1993); 
Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Internet Sols., Inc., 205 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 
2000). 
Oregon: 
OR. R. Civ. P. 4 (Westlaw through Mar. 3, 2020); State, ex rel. Hydraulic 
Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 657 P.2d 211 (Or. 1982); Tech Heads, Inc. v. 
Desktop Serv. Ctr., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Or. 2000). 
Pennsylvania: 
42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (West, Westlaw through 
2021 Reg. Sess. Act 9); Kenny v. Alexson Equip. Co., 432 A.2d 974 (Pa. 
1981); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997). 
Puerto Rico: 
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32A, § III, R. 4.7 (2019); Pou v. Am. Motors Corp., 
127 P.R. Dec. 810 (P.R. 1991). 
Rhode Island: 
9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 7, 2020); Conn v. 
ITT Aetna Fin. Co., 252 A.2d 184 (R.I. 1969). 
South Carolina: 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (Westlaw through 2021 Act No. 7); Sheppard 
v. Jacksonville Marine Supply, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 260 (D.S.C. 1995). 
South Dakota: 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7-2 (Westlaw through Mar. 22, 2021); Ventling 
v. Kraft, 161 N.W.2d 29 (S.D. 1968). 
Tennessee: 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 3, 2021); 
Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., F. Supp. 2d 790 (W.D. Tenn. 2000); 
Masada Inv. Corp. v. Allen, 697 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1985). 
Texas: 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (West, Westlaw through 
end of the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Leg.); Riviera Operating Corp. v. 
Dawson, 29 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000); U-Anchor Advert., Inc. v. 
Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977). 
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Utah: 
UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 78-27-24, renumbered as § 78B-3-205 (West 
through 2020 6th Spec. Sess.); Brown v. Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378 (Utah 
1980); iAccess, Inc. v. WEBcard Techs., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. 
Utah 2002). 
Vermont: 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 855, 913 (West, Westlaw through Acts 1 through 
4 of the Reg. Sess. of the 2021–2022 Vt. Gen. Assemb.); Bard Bldg. Supply 
Co. v. United Foam Corp., 400 A.2d 1023 (Vt. 1979); O’Brien v. Comstock 
Foods, Inc., 194 A.2d 568 (Vt. 1963). 
Virginia: 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (West, Westlaw through the End of 2021 
Reg. Sess.); Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.Com, 128 
F. Supp. 2d 340 (E.D. Va. 2001); Carmichael v. Snyder, 164 S.E.2d 703 
(Va. 1968); Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. 
Va. 2002). 
Washington: 
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 8 of the 
2021 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.); Precision Lab. Plastics v. Micro Test, 
Inc., 981 P.2d 454 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel 
Prods., Inc., of Washington, 381 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1963). 
West Virginia: 
W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 16, 2021); Abbott 
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 444 S.E.2d 285 (W.Va. 1994). 
Wisconsin: 
WIS. STAT. § 801.05 (West, Westlaw through Apr. 18, 2020); PKWare, 
Inc. v. Timothy L. Meade, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Zerbel 
v. H.L. Federman & Co., 179 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1970). 
Wyoming: 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-107 (West, Westlaw through Chapters 1–3 of the 
2020 Spec. Sess. of the Wyo. Leg.); First Wyoming Bank, N.A., Rawlins v. 
Trans Mountain Sales & Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1979). 
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